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Abstract:  
We examine the role of cross-listing in alleviating domestic market constraint and 
facilitating cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Cross-listing appears to strengthen 
the bargaining power of target firms, allowing them to extract higher takeover premiums 
relative to their non-cross-listed peers. Moreover, shareholders of Sarbanes-Oxley-
compliant targets seem to benefit from a higher premium. We also find that cross-listed 
firms are more likely to be acquisition targets. This evidence is consistent with the idea 
that cross-listing increases firms’ attractiveness and visibility on the market for corporate 
control. Our results are robust to various specifications and to the self-selection bias 
arising from the decision to cross-list. 
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 I. Introduction 
In many countries, investors face significant constraints that increase the expense and the 
difficulty of selling their holdings. Numerous studies document the effects of these restrictions 
on the ownership structures prevailing in these countries. La Porta et al. (1999) show that, in 
most countries outside the US, firms typically have a controlling shareholder, often within a 
family structure. Underdevelopment of capital markets and weak investor protection in these 
countries account for the prevalence of this family structure (Bhattacharya and Ravikumar, 2001; 
Burkart et al., 2003). Ayyagari and Doidge (2010) argue that cross-listing on a US stock 
exchange allows controlling shareholders to overcome the limitations they face in their domestic 
market and facilitates changes in corporate ownership and control. Tracking ownership structures 
over time, Ayyagari and Doidge (2010) find that controlling shareholders of cross-listed firms 
are more likely to sell their stakes than those of non-cross-listed firms.  
In this study, we extend this literature by investigating the effects of US cross-listings on 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Specifically, we address the following questions: (1) Does 
cross-listing in US markets facilitate the sale of cross-listed firms? (2) Does it allow target 
shareholders to maximize their selling proceeds? Controlling shareholders may want to sell their 
block stakes for various reasons, including diversification and the need for liquidity. However, in 
countries where the market for corporate control is inefficient and poorly developed, it may be 
difficult to find an acquirer company, especially for large firms. In addition, low corporate 
valuations, illiquid stock markets, and weak corporate governance generally characterize these 
countries. Such restrictions in the domestic market render selling block stakes extremely costly 
and difficult. Cross-listing in the US offers an interesting channel through which shareholders of 
foreign firms can surmount their home market constraints and maximize the proceeds from 
selling off their firm. 
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The high percentage of acquisitions following a cross-listing in the US suggests that this 
strategy may be more frequent than it first appears. For instance, Chaplinsky and Ramchand 
(2009) report that M&As following a cross-listing on a US stock exchange represent 43% of 
total delistings and 24% of total new listings. Furthermore, according to Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand (2009), these firms tend to be large and high-quality firms, suggesting that they may 
seek larger acquirers and higher valuations, otherwise inaccessible in their domestic market. 
Thus, maximizing sales proceeds could be an important motivation for the cross-listing. 
Our paper is also related to the Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) literature that presents the IPO 
as an effective first-stage in the planned sale of a firm. In a model that analyzes the decision to 
go public, Zingales (1995) shows that an initial sale of a portion of the cash-flow rights to 
dispersed shareholders, when followed by transfer of control in a second stage, enables the 
incumbent to extract a greater surplus from the buyer. Likewise, Mello and Parsons (1998) show 
that an optimal strategy for the sale of a firm should proceed in stages, where the initial sale of 
shares to passive and small investors (that is, an IPO) will provide the seller with valuable 
information to negotiate the terms of sale of the controlling block to active investors. These 
models that view the transfer of control as a key factor in the going-public decision seem 
relevant to the decision to cross-list on a US stock exchange. Indeed, prior to the sale of the 
foreign firm, controlling shareholders could have incentives to offer a portion of their shares to 
the US market through a cross-listing. This two-stage process would allow them to increase their 
proceeds over and above what they would have obtained without a prior cross-listing. 
To our knowledge, our research is the first to examine the impact of cross-listings on the 
acquisition of cross-listed firms. Existing studies on the effect of cross-listings on M&As 
examine how cross-listing affects the acquisition behavior of cross-listed firms (Tolmunen and 
Torstila, 2005; Burns et al., 2007; Owers et al., 2008). These papers show that cross-listed firms 
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are significantly more active in acquiring US companies than their non-cross-listed peers. 
Several reasons are invoked to explain this evidence. First, cross-listed acquirers obtain valuable 
exposure in the target’s market (the US) through increased visibility, transparency, and 
recognition. Second, cross-listing creates an "acquisition currency" (the Depositary Receipt) that 
is better aligned with target shareholder preferences, providing a convenient solution to the home 
bias.  
We contribute to the literature in four ways. First, we examine whether cross-listing increases 
the attractiveness of foreign firms on the market for corporate control. The literature associates 
cross-listing with several benefits that would make cross-listed firms more likely takeover 
targets. Cross-listing on US stock exchanges involves adhesion to more rigorous disclosure 
requirements which enhance transparency and reduce asymmetric information vis-à-vis potential 
acquirers, hence allowing a more accurate assessment of the value of the target firm. Cross-
listing also increases international recognition and visibility as a result of increased analyst 
coverage and broadened investor base.
1
 Consequently, cross-listing would expose foreign firms 
to a wider range of potential acquirers, including foreign as well as domestic ones.  
Second, we contribute to the literature on both target shareholders' gains from takeovers and 
the benefits of cross-listing when we examine whether shareholders of target cross-listed firms 
obtain higher premiums relative to their non-cross-listed peers. Based on the "double-exit" IPO 
models previously discussed (Zingales, 1995; Mello and Parsons, 1998), cross-listing should 
allow original shareholders to maximize their proceeds in two ways. (1) Cross-listing triggers a 
positive stock price reaction on its announcement date (Miller, 1999) and produces a permanent 
valuation differential over non-cross-listed firms (i.e. the "cross-listing premium" documented in 
Doidge et al., 2004), thus allowing controlling shareholders to raise the value of their shares. (2) 
                                                 
1
 See Karolyi (2006) for a thorough review of the benefits of cross-listing. 
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As a result of higher bargaining power and lower information asymmetries, shareholders of 
cross-listed firms should be able to extract an additional gain from a subsequent block sale of the 
firm.  
Third, there is still no consensus that the bonding hypothesis holds for firms that cross-list on 
a US stock exchange. This hypothesis, initially proposed by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz 
(1999), posits that firms intentionally cross-list in the US to limit expropriation of minority 
shareholders by managers and controlling shareholders. Acquisitions of cross-listed firms 
provide a valuable setting to investigate whether cross-listing in the US is an effective bonding 
mechanism. If cross-listing leads to better corporate governance, the probability of acquisition 
will be higher for cross-listed firms than for non-cross-listed firms. Additionally, the premium 
paid to cross-listed firms would also be greater, since the acquiring firm would perceive benefits 
from owning a target subject to stringent disclosure and governance standards. Furthermore, if 
the bonding hypothesis holds, this premium would be higher for cross-listed targets originating 
from countries with weak investor protection. 
Fourth, we contribute to the literature on the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) when 
we examine the takeover likelihood and the acquisition premium of foreign cross-listed firms 
following its adoption. Since its enactment in 2002, SOX has been the subject of a growing 
number of empirical researches focusing mostly on its repercussions on listing/delisting 
decisions and stock market reactions (e.g., Engel et al., 2007; Litvak, 2007; Doidge et al., 2010). 
However, how SOX affects M&As remains an unexplored issue. Some SOX requirements are 
likely to have a considerable impact on the acquisition decision and on the way these 
transactions are conducted (Walton and Greenberg, 2004). Indeed, SOX imposes certification 
and reporting requirements that apply to the entire firm, including its acquired entities 
immediately after the deal is completed. Therefore, the target firm’s level of compliance is a 
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major factor when a SOX-compliant firm is considering a takeover, since inheriting weaknesses 
in the target’s reporting and internal control system may be very costly.  
We analyze an extensive sample of non-US targets of M&As announced between 1990 and 
2008, and we compare exchange-listed firms (via level II and Level III ADRs and direct 
listings), non-exchange-listed firms (via Rule 144a or level I ADRs), and non-cross-listed firms. 
We show that foreign firms that cross-list on US stock exchanges have a significantly higher 
takeover likelihood than non-exchange-listed and non-cross-listed firms. In contrast, non-
exchange-listed firms exhibit a takeover likelihood that is not significantly different from their 
non-cross-listed peers. This evidence is robust to accounting for the self-selection bias arising 
from the decision to cross-list and is more pronounced among emerging market countries. 
Furthermore, controlling for various determinants of the takeover premium, we find that cross-
listing on US exchanges significantly increases the premium obtained by cross-listed targets. In 
contrast, cross-listing via non-exchange ADRs has a positive but insignificant impact on the 
takeover premium. These results support the idea that cross-listing on US exchanges increases 
the value and attractiveness of foreign firms on the market for corporate control. 
When we examine the impact of SOX on M&As, we find that SOX-compliant cross-listed 
targets (exchange-listed) obtain significantly higher premiums after the adoption of SOX, 
compared to non-SOX compliant targets (non-exchange-listed). This result suggests that 
acquirers perceive SOX as value-adding and are willing to overpay to buy a transparent company 
with an efficient internal control system. However, we provide no evidence of a link between the 
enactment of SOX and the takeover likelihood. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the related literature 
and the main hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample construction and the variables used in 
the analysis, while section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
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II. Related literature and hypothesis development 
The literature attributes several benefits to listing abroad. For instance, Pagano et al. (2002) 
argue that listing abroad allows divesting shareholders to sell out on better terms by increasing 
the market value of their stake. A notable case is privatization, where governments often target 
foreign investors to sell out their companies. Listing on a more liquid foreign market allows 
governments to maximize privatization proceeds (Bortolotti et al., 2002). Indeed, floating a large 
stake in a country providing higher legal protection to investors is a signal that the selling 
government is committed to refrain from expropriating minority shareholders. In turn, investors 
will be willing to pay more for a less risky asset. Large shareholdings by foreign investors may 
also play an important role in monitoring managers, thereby inducing higher efficiency and 
profitability. 
This argument may be extended to private companies as well. Divesting blockholders of firms 
from less developed markets may find it more advantageous to sell out on foreign markets. For 
instance, cross-listing on US markets may be an efficient way to increase the market value of the 
firm and, eventually, to transfer control with maximum proceeds. In countries with illiquid stock 
markets and inefficient markets for corporate control, a prior cross-listing may be rewarding for 
large shareholders who seek to divest their block stake. The literature on cross-listing points out 
several benefits associated with listing on US markets that are likely to make cross-listed firms 
attractive takeover targets. Since several articles review these benefits in great detail (e.g., 
Pagano et al., 2002; Karolyi, 1998, 2006; King and Mittoo, 2007), we confine the following 
section to a brief discussion of some of these benefits relating to our hypotheses.  
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1. Cross-listing benefits and acquisitions 
Doidge et al. (2004) document that foreign firms cross-listing their shares in the US are worth 
more than their non-cross-listed peers. This "cross-listing premium" stems from the reduced risk 
that managers and controlling shareholders will expropriate minority shareholders through their 
commitment to abide by stringent US regulations. By setting a limit on private benefits, cross-
listing in the US improves the ability of firms to generate and exploit growth opportunities 
through a better use of resources. We conjecture that this cross-listing advantage (better 
governance and growth opportunities) would make cross-listed firms more attractive and thus 
more likely targets than their non-cross-listed counterparts. 
Several other studies document additional benefits from cross-listing in the US that enhance 
firm value. In particular, cross-listing has been related to lower cost of capital  (Hail and Leuz, 
2009), increased international recognition and visibility, and higher stock liquidity stemming 
from a larger shareholder base and increased analyst coverage (Baker et al., 2002; Lang et al., 
2003; Bailey et al., 2006; King and Segal, 2009). Cross-listing on US exchanges also imposes 
rigorous disclosure requirements which increase the firm's transparency and reduce asymmetric 
information vis-à-vis potential acquirers (US and non-US). Lang et al. (2003) observe that cross-
listed firms benefit from wider analyst coverage and more accurate forecasts.  
Benefits from cross-listing vary with the type of listing. By listing on an organized exchange 
(via Levels II and III ADRs or direct listings), foreign firms adopt the same disclosure and 
regulatory requirements as US listed firms, while non-exchange listings (Rule 144a private 
placement and OTC listings) involve minimal reporting. Doidge et al. (2004) report higher cross-
listing premiums for exchange listings, suggesting that the benefits from cross-listing are higher 
for this type of listing. We would then expect a higher probability of acquisition for firms cross-
listing on a US stock exchange. Although listing by means of non-exchange ADRs only requires 
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incremental disclosure relative to the home market, it provides a relatively larger shareholder 
base and wider recognition compared to non-cross-listed firms. Hence, the impact of cross-listing 
on the probability of becoming a target is still expected to be significant for this type of listing. 
From the previous discussion, we derive the following hypothesis: 
H1: Foreign firms that cross-list in the US are more likely to become acquisition targets in 
comparison to their non-cross-listed peers. This probability increases for exchange-listed firms 
which are subject to more stringent disclosure requirements. 
 
2. Investor protection, private benefits, and acquisitions 
The M&A literature provides evidence on the impact of regulation and shareholder protection 
on M&A activity and transaction terms. Overall, the findings from previous studies suggest that 
both the volume of acquisitions and the acquisition premium increase with higher investor 
protection and better accounting standards. Our hypotheses related to these findings are 
discussed in the following section along with a brief review of the literature. 
 
2.1. Investor protection and the takeover premium  
Rossi and Volpin (2004) observe that target firms from countries with stronger investor 
protection obtain higher takeover premiums. They report an average increase of 6% in the 
premium for a one-point increase in the level of shareholder protection. Similarly, Black et al. 
(2007) find that US acquirers pay lower premiums for targets from countries where accounting 
data are less value relevant. Rossi and Volpin (2004) put forward two explanations for the higher 
takeover premium they document for target firms from countries with stronger investor 
protection. First, targets subject to tighter regulation have lower cost of capital; this fosters 
competition among bidders and therefore increases the premium paid by the winning bidder. 
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Second, countries with higher investor protection are characterized by dispersed ownership. This 
aggravates the free-rider problem in takeovers and forces the bidder to pay a higher premium to 
induce all shareholders to tender (Grossman and Hart, 1980).  
These results lead us to posit that shareholders of foreign firms cross-listing on US markets 
would be able to extract higher acquisition premiums owing to their higher disclosure and 
regulatory standards and their more dispersed ownership of capital. Further, acquisitions often 
involve restructuring the acquired entity. Targets operating in weak investor protection 
environment and thus having less rigorous corporate governance and internal control practices, 
would require more costly post-acquisition restructuring than targets from a better legal regime. 
These costs decrease the value of expected acquisition synergies and thus reduce the price 
acquirers are willing to pay in excess of the prevailing market price (the acquisition premium). 
Therefore, a value should be assigned to better governance practices and observed through 
higher takeover premiums. We propose to test the following hypothesis for the premium:  
H2: Foreign firms cross-listing in the US extract higher acquisition premiums than their non-
cross-listed peers. This premium increases for exchange-listed firms. 
 
2.2. Legal bonding and acquisitions of cross-listed firms 
In their study of the role of the legal environment in cross-border takeovers, Rossi and Volpin 
(2004) report that better shareholder protection in the target country is associated with a higher 
M&A volume. Nenova (2003) and Dyck and Zingales (2004) find that high investor protection is 
related to low levels of private benefits of control. This finding suggests that the market for 
corporate control operates more effectively with higher shareholder protection, since managers 
enjoying lower private benefits, would not oppose a value-enhancing takeover. In addition, 
potential targets in these countries are easily identifiable with better disclosure and accounting 
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standards. Overall, the evidence suggests that there are more potential targets in countries with 
better investor protection and accounting standards. When cross-listing on US stock exchanges, 
foreign firms commit to meet the requirements of US regulations, thereby limiting their private 
benefits and entering a more efficient market for corporate control. These firms are therefore 
more likely to become takeover targets.  
We rely upon the bonding hypothesis, suggested by Coffee (1999, 2002) and Stulz (1999), to 
develop predictions regarding the takeover likelihood and premium obtained by cross-listed 
firms. This hypothesis posits that firms intentionally cross-list in the US to prevent expropriation 
of minority shareholders by managers and controlling shareholders, which should in turn 
increase the market value of these firms.
2
 Indeed, Doidge et al. (2004) provide evidence that 
firms from countries with poorer investor protection experience a greater increase in their market 
value after listing their shares in the US. We would expect acquirers to perceive larger benefits 
from a US listing for firms from weak investor protection countries and we hypothesize that this 
will have a positive effect on their selection and valuation of such target firms. If acquiring firms 
perceive that cross-listed firms gain greater growth potential and better corporate governance by 
committing to more stringent regulation, they will then prefer purchasing cross-listed firms 
rather than non-cross-listed ones. We also expect the differential in acquisition premiums 
between cross-listed and non-cross-listed targets to be higher for firms from weak regulatory 
regimes, since these firms gain the most from a US listing. We therefore formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
H3: Cross-listed firms from weak investor protection countries are more likely to be acquired 
and to obtain higher premiums compared to their non-cross-listed peers. 
                                                 
2
 Some studies have questioned the effectiveness of a US cross-listing in protecting minority shareholders 
and enforcing stringent US regulations (e.g., Siegel, 2005; Lang et al., 2006).  
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3. The effects of SOX  
The adoption of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002 has introduced radical changes in the 
reporting and corporate governance environment of firms listed on US exchanges. Since then, a 
mounting number of empirical studies has tried to assess its effects on various issues, in 
particular on listing, going-private, and going-dark decisions (e.g., Engel et al., 2007; Marosi and 
Massoud, 2007; Leuz et al., 2008; Kamar et al., 2009). Other papers focus on firm value and 
market reaction around key SOX events (e.g., Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; Litvak, 2007; 
Zhang, 2007; Li et al., 2008); market liquidity (e.g., Jain et al., 2008); firm risk and cost of equity 
(e.g., Akhigbe et al., 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009); accounting and audit costs (e.g., 
Asthana et al., 2004; Eldridge and Kealy, 2005). Leuz (2007) argues that the key problem in 
most studies of SOX’s impact on US firms is the absence a control group of comparable firms 
that are not affected by SOX. To address this shortcoming, recent studies have taken an 
international perspective and opposed foreign firms cross-listed on US exchanges (subject to 
SOX) to foreign firms cross-listed via unlisted ADR programs (not subject to SOX) and to non-
cross-listed foreign firms which are not affected by US regulations (e.g., Litvak, 2007; Doidge et 
al., 2009a). 
Despite the considerable number of studies related to SOX effects, to our knowledge, the 
question of how SOX affects M&A activity has not yet been empirically examined. A few papers 
discuss SOX’s potential implications for M&A practices, particularly with regard to the 
negotiation process and due diligence as well as reporting and post-merger integration (e.g., 
Walton and Greenberg, 2004; Karan and Sharifi, 2006). A document by 
PriceWaterHouseCoopers (2004) also draws attention to the effects of SOX on M&A 
transactions. According to these studies, some SOX requirements are so stringent that weak 
internal controls in the target firm could constitute a "deal-breaker". 
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To avoid the problem documented in Leuz (2007), we examine the impact of SOX on the 
acquisition of cross-listed firms by comparing exchange-listed and non-exchange-listed targets. 
We expect the adoption of SOX to have contributed to increasing acquisitions of SOX-compliant 
cross-listed firms for two reasons. First, many studies associate SOX with the going-private and 
the going-dark decisions of firms listed on US exchanges and seeking to escape from SOX and 
its onerous compliance costs (Engel et al., 2007, Marosi and Massoud, 2007; Leuz et al., 2008). 
One way to do so is by selling the firm to a private US (or non-US) acquirer which releases the 
acquired firm from its SEC duties (Kamar et al., 2009). The second explanation, which we 
investigate in this paper, is that cross-listed firms have become more attractive targets after SOX 
owing to their commitment to more stringent governance and reporting requirements. Before 
developing this hypothesis, we briefly discuss how some provisions of SOX would impact the 
M&A activity in general. 
 
3.1. SOX key provisions and the M&A activity 
While complying with SOX is demanding for one company, it is even more challenging when 
two companies are involved. As discussed by Walton and Greenberg (2004) and Karan and 
Sharifi (2006), some SOX provisions affect both the acquisition and the subsequent integration 
processes. In particular, Sections 302 and 404 of SOX impose certification and reporting 
requirements that apply to the entire firm, including acquired entities. Section 302, effective 
since August 29, 2002, requires that the chief executive and financial officers certify the 
accuracy of quarterly and annual reports and the effectiveness of internal controls.
3
 A corollary 
of section 302 is that acquired entities must be included in this certification in the first quarter-
end following the acquisition, which would imply a more complex process if the acquired firm 
                                                 
3
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act - Section 302 "Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual 
Reports", Securities and Exchange Commission. 
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was subject to a weak accounting and governance regime before the acquisition. Section 404, 
effective since November 15, 2004, requires an annual management report on internal controls 
over financial reporting as well as the certification of their effectiveness by an outside auditor.
4
 
The acquired firm becomes subject to the same requirements starting from the first year-end 
following the acquisition. This section of SOX is considered to be the most burdensome and thus 
is expected to produce the largest impact on the M&A activity. 
From this discussion, it appears that SOX could affect M&As in a number of ways. First, 
acquirers subject to SOX must deploy greater efforts and resources in due diligence, since they 
will be responsible for the target’s actions and financial reports for the year preceding the 
takeover. Consequently, firms with weak accounting standards and control procedures may not 
be the perfect targets, since the acquisition process would require higher due diligence, more 
time and resources to insure that the target meets SOX requirements. SOX may also trigger more 
post-merger failures among M&As involving a SOX-compliant acquirer (US public firm) and a 
non-SOX-compliant target (US private or foreign firm). Indeed, bringing the acquired firm into 
compliance may fail, especially given the tighter delays for the quarterly certification imposed by 
Section 302.  
 
3.2. SOX and acquisitions of cross-listed firms 
Acquirers subject to SOX should assess the extent to which their targets are in compliance 
with SOX requirements before the acquisition. In particular, they need to take into consideration 
the legal environment of their potential targets before engaging in costly negotiations and due 
diligence. As a consequence, SOX-compliant acquirers may prefer to purchase firms that are 
already conforming to SOX to avoid costs and uncertainties related to bringing the target into 
                                                 
4
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act - Section 404 "Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting 
and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports", Securities and Exchange Commission. 
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compliance. An acquirer seeking international expansion through cross-border M&As would 
naturally target cross-listed firms. This is particularly true if the target is from a country with 
poor governance and accounting standards. In this case, complying with SOX would be the most 
costly and challenging. Even for non-SOX-compliant acquirers, SOX-compliant targets would be 
more attractive since they are more transparent and possess a certified effective internal control 
system (supposing that they actually meet SOX requirements). Accordingly, we enunciate the 
following hypothesis:  
H4: Foreign firms that cross-list on US exchanges (subject to SOX) are more likely to become 
targets after SOX compared to non-cross-listed firms and to non-exchange-listed firms (not 
subject to SOX), especially firms from countries with weak governance and accounting 
standards. 
Given the substantial resources necessary to ensure the compliance of the acquired entity to 
SOX, it is plausible that the premium paid by SOX-compliant acquirers would reflect these costs. 
The enactment of SOX may have increased the costs of compliance with US regulations, but, in 
the mean time, it offers "a certification effect" for the transparency of the firm and the efficiency 
of its governance and control system. In this context, the question we ask is: Do acquirers value 
this certification effect by paying higher premiums to SOX-compliant targets compared to non-
SOX- compliant targets? Assuming that their reporting and internal control systems are efficient, 
target firms already complying with SOX require lower acquisition costs (e.g., in audit and post-
restructuring), and therefore would obtain higher premiums as a result of higher expected 
synergies. We therefore formulate the following hypothesis: 
H5: Following the enactment of SOX, foreign firms that cross-list on US exchanges (subject to 
SOX) obtain higher acquisition premiums than non-exchange-listed firms (not subject to SOX), 
especially firms from countries with weak governance and accounting standards.  
15 
 
III. Data description 
1. Sample selection 
We collect data on mergers and acquisitions from Thomson’s Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC hereafter) and include all completed domestic and cross-border transactions involving 
public non-US targets announced between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2008.
5 
We start 
from 1990 because Worldscope database, from which we obtain financial statement data, became 
more comprehensive from the 1990s. Following Rossi and Volpin (2004), we restrict the sample 
to M&As of majority interests
6
 in order to minimize potential biases due to cross-country 
differences in disclosure requirements of minority stakes’ transfers (below 50%). With these 
criteria, our M&A list counts 39,380 transactions, 36% of which are cross-border. The next step 
is to identify, from this M&A list, firms that were cross-listed in the US at the moment of the 
acquisition. For this purpose, we collect data on all foreign firms that cross-listed in the US, 
whether through direct listing (via common shares) or indirect listing (via ADRs), as described in 
the following paragraph. As in previous studies (e.g., Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Doidge et al., 
2004), we include direct cross-listings in our sample, since they are subject to the same reporting 
requirements as exchange-listed ADRs. 
We obtain data on ADR listings from the websites of the major depositary banks (Bank of 
New York, Citibank, JP Morgan, and Deutsch bank). Since none of these four sources provides 
an exhaustive list of the ADR universe, the four lists are merged based on the CUSIP (which is a 
unique identifier for each issue). In the presence of inconsistencies between the different sources 
(e.g., in the listing date, the ADR type, the home country, etc.), data provided by the 
corresponding depositary bank are maintained. Listing dates are validated using various sources, 
                                                 
5
 Cross-border transactions are defined by SDC as transactions in which the target is not located in the 
same country as the acquirer's ultimate parent. 
6
 Applicable when the acquirer owns less than 50% of the target company’s stock before the deal, and 
more than 50% after the deal. 
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including data from NYSE and Nasdaq on international firms listed on these exchanges, SDC 
new issues and CRSP.
7
 
We also obtain Information on delisted firms from the depositary banks, mainly from 
Citibank which keeps track of inactive issues, supplemented with data on terminated ADRs from 
the other banks. With the exception of Citibank, the other depositary banks provide limited data 
on delisted ADRs and do not report their listing date. We cross-check, fill in the missing listing 
dates, and supplement this list using CRSP (which has the advantage of providing data on 
delisted firms as well) and SDC new issues database. We could not obtain full information on the 
missing listing dates for all terminated ADRs reported by the depositary banks, and neither the 
stock exchanges nor the OTC Bulletin Board keeps publicly available records for these issues. 
Therefore, we disregard terminated ADRs for which we could not find a listing date. 
Finally, we obtain the list of direct cross-listings on US exchanges (via ordinary shares) from 
CRSP (for listed and delisted issues), and we validate and complete it with data from NYSE and 
Nasdaq on international firms listed directly on these exchanges. Again, these stock exchanges 
only provide data on currently listed firms. Using CRSP, however, allows us to alleviate the 
survivorship bias, as this database keeps track of delisted firms. The final sample of firms that 
have cross-listed between 1990 and 2008 includes 4,896 issues, 18% of which are Exchange-
listed ADRs (levels II and III), 22% are direct listings (common shares), 43% are Over-The-
Counter (or level I) ADRs and 17% are Rule 144a (or level IV) ADRs. 
To identify whether cross-listed firms in our sample have been takeover targets, we match 
them with the M&A list obtained from SDC. Most papers use CRSP's delisting codes to identify 
the delisting reason (merger or others). Since CRSP only provides data for Exchange-listed 
                                                 
7
 CRSP database only covers listings on major US exchanges (NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq), thus 
providing only data on Level II and Level III ADRs and direct listings. Share codes 12, 30, and 31 in 
CRSP refer to all foreign firms that are listed on a major US stock exchange. Share codes 30 and 31 are 
attributed to ADRs while share code 12 refers to common shares listed by companies incorporated outside 
the U.S (direct cross-listings). 
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firms, using SDC is necessary to identify the status of Level I and Rule 144a listed firms. We use 
SDC for this purpose and cross-check with CRSP delisting codes and dates for Exchange-listed 
firms.
8
 Panel A of Table 1 provides a breakdown of the sample according to the cross-listing 
type and the acquisition status (over the entire period and within 5 years from the cross-listing). 
Over the entire period, exchange-listed firms are associated with a high percentage of 
acquisitions (34% for exchange ADRs and 26% for direct listings, resulting in an average 30% 
for exchange-listings), whereas 23% among Rule 144a listings are acquired and only 16% among 
level I ADRs. The same pattern is observed 5 years after cross-listing in the US, where nearly 
17% of exchange-listed firms are targets of successful acquisitions.  
Panel B depicts the acquisition status of cross-listed firms by year for each cross-listing type. 
For each year, we report the number of new listings and the proportion of acquisitions among 
these new listings. A cross-listed firm is considered as acquired if the acquisition occurs between 
the cross-listing date and the last date in the sample (31 December 2008). In this stage of the 
analysis, we do not account for the time-to-acquisition since the cross-listing date— in the sense 
that we do not distinguish between a firm acquired within 2 years from its cross-listing and a 
firm acquired after 10 years. We shall take this effect into consideration in a duration analysis 
that we present in the last section of the paper. Panel C presents the acquisition status by country 
over the entire period. Figure 1 shows that firms from the U.K. and Canada carry out the highest 
number of cross-listings in the US and are also associated with the highest percentage of 
acquisitions. Indeed, over the entire period, 38% of the cross-listed firms originating from these 
two countries were targets of acquisitions. 
*** Insert Table 1 about here *** 
                                                 
8
 Firms do not necessarily delist when acquired. Any firm that has been the target of an acquisition by a 
majority interest, as classified by SDC, is considered to be acquired in our sample. 
18 
 
In addition to the cross-listing sample, we construct a control sample of foreign firms that did 
not cross-list in the US over the same period (acquired or not). We use this control sample in the 
panel regressions on the takeover likelihood. We select it among all public firms from the same 
home countries as those included in the cross-listing sample, and for which data is available on 
Thomson Financial’s Worldscope database for at least three years. To determine the acquisition 
status of these firms, we match them with target firms from SDC's M&A list, resulting in 6,665 
targets with available data. Finally, among the remaining non-acquired firms, we exclude firms 
that were delisted as of 31 December 2008, keeping only active firms, in order to avoid any 
specific effects related to the delisting. This results in a control sample of 9,633 foreign public 
firms that have not cross-listed in the US. 
Following Doidge et al. (2009a), we exclude firms headquartered in tax-havens (e.g., 
Bermuda, Channel Islands, …) since many are US firms that adopt the foreign status only for tax 
purposes. Finally, we eliminate firms operating in the financial sector (first digit SIC code of 6) 
to ensure better comparability of financial statement data across industries. In some of the 
analysis, the sample size is reduced due to data limitation, in particular for the acquisition 
premium. The number of retained observations is specified in the tables displaying the results.  
 
2. Definition of variables 
We consider several variables at the firm-, transaction-, and country-levels and ascertain their 
impact on the takeover likelihood and the premium paid to cross-listed targets. Appendix 1 
summarizes these variables and indicates their sources. 
Firm-level variables 
We retrieve firm-level attributes from Worldscope database. In the takeover likelihood 
regressions, we base the choice of firm-level variables on existing theories and empirical studies 
modeling the takeover likelihood. We measure these variables at the beginning of the firm-year: 
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- Size, measured by the logarithm of market capitalization in US dollars. Takeovers generate 
costs related to the integration of the target into the acquirer’s organizational structure. These 
costs increase with target size. As a result, large firms are exposed to a narrow set of potential 
acquirers that are able to absorb high takeover costs. Several studies provide empirical support 
for this hypothesis (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997). Thus, we expect the target size to be negatively 
related to the takeover likelihood. 
- Growth, measured by the three-year growth rate of sales, and leverage, measured by the total 
debt to total assets ratio. The "growth-resource imbalance" theory (Palepu, 1986; Powell, 1997, 
2004) advocates that high-growth and financially constrained (highly leveraged) firms are more 
likely to be targeted since they have limited bargaining power, making them attractive targets. 
Alternately, low-growth firms with high resources are more likely to be targeted by acquirers 
seeking to absorb their resources. 
- Tobin’s Q, is the ratio of the market-to-book value of assets, computed as (book value of assets 
+ market capitalization – book value of equity)/ book value of assets. This measure is generally 
used as an indicator of whether a firm’s assets are over- or undervalued by the market. Lower Q 
indicates a cheaper target and therefore increases its probability of being acquired. Recent 
theories and empirical work in the M&A literature advance that market misevaluation drives 
mergers and that overvalued firms tend to buy less overvalued firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; 
Andrade and Stafford, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004; Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, 
and Viswanathan, 2005; Dong et al., 2006; Ang and Cheng, 2006). Overvalued firms may be 
more able to survive and expand through acquisitions, while undervalued firms are less likely to 
survive as independent entities.  
- Return on Equity (ROE), the ratio of net income to book value of equity, as a measure for 
management performance. Pros of the "inefficient management theory" consider takeovers as an 
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important disciplinary mechanism to correct management inefficiency by replacing poorly 
performing managers with more efficient ones. Accordingly, poorly managed firms are more 
likely to become targets. Agrawal and Jaffe (2003a, 2003b) review related empirical evidence 
and reexamine this hypothesis but do not find much support for it. 
- Free Cash-Flows (FCFs), the ratio of free cash-flows to total assets, as a measure for corporate 
liquidity. According to Jensen (1986), FCFs must be distributed to shareholders in order to 
maximize value and increase the firm's efficiency. As a result, managers have lower resources 
under their control, which reduces their power and subjects them to monitoring by capital 
markets when the firm needs outside financing. This theory predicts that firms that have retained 
high levels of FCFs are more likely to become takeover targets (Powell, 1997, 2004). 
- The ratio of foreign sales to total sales is used as a proxy for the firm’s level of openness to 
international markets. Since we are examining cross-border takeovers (as well as domestic ones), 
we need to control for this factor. Openness to international markets increases the firm’s 
visibility, exposing it to a larger pool of potential acquirers. 
For regressions involving the acquisition premium, the firm-level variables are size— 
measured as the logarithm of the firm’s market capitalization four weeks before the M&A's 
announcement—and the three-year growth rate of the firm's sales as a proxy for growth 
opportunities, measured at the fiscal-year-end preceding the acquisition. Larger transactions are 
associated with lower premiums, while firms with higher prospects of growth obtain higher 
premiums (e.g., Rossi and Volpin, 2004). 
Transaction-level variables 
At the transaction level, we include a number of control variables identified in the traditional 
M&A literature as determinants of the acquisition premium. First, we use three dummy variables 
to indicate whether the deal involves a tender offer (Tender), multiple bidders (Contested bid), or 
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is classified as hostile or unsolicited (Hostile). These variables are known to have a positive 
impact on the takeover premium. The bidder in a tender offer needs to pay a higher premium in 
order to induce all shareholders to tender their shares (the free-rider hypothesis, Grossman and 
Hart (1980)), while the presence of multiple bidders increases the premium through a 
competition effect. Hostile takeovers are unwanted by the target’s board and therefore acquirers 
are expected to pay a higher price in order to attract the maximum number of shares.  
We also control for cross-border transactions using a dummy variable, as they may have a 
different impact relative to domestic transactions. In addition, the percentage of the target’s 
shares owned by the acquirer before the announcement (Toehold) is expected to be negatively 
correlated to the premium. One explanation is that the higher the toehold, the lower the 
proportion of shares the acquirer needs to purchase after the announcement and, therefore, the 
lower the target’s bargaining power (Hirshleifer and Titman, 1990)9. Finally, glamour acquirers 
(as measured by high market-to-book ratios) are expected to overpay for their acquisitions as 
they tend to overestimate the gain from future synergies generated in the target (Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998). We control for this effect through the market-to-book ratio (MB) of the 
acquirer four weeks before the announcement. Following Rossi and Volpin (2004), we measure 
the acquisition premium by the natural logarithm of the percentage of the offer price to the 
closing price of the target four weeks before the M&A’s announcement.  
Country-level variables 
Based on Rossi and Volpin's (2004) evidence that countries with higher shareholder 
protection are characterized by higher M&A volumes, we expect the probability of becoming a 
target to be positively related to the level of investor protection. On the other hand, M&As are 
                                                 
9 Many researchers have tried to model this relation. Another explanation is that the toehold induces a 
run-up in the stock price when it is detected by the market, which makes the bid premium lower (Bris, 
2002).  
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considered a mechanism for improving corporate governance when acquirers pursue acquisition 
in countries with poorer investor protection (Rossi and Volpin, 2004). A lower level of investor 
protection may increase the likelihood of becoming a target. In addition, the level of shareholder 
protection in the target country is expected to be positively related to the takeover premium 
(Rossi and Volpin, 2004). 
At the country level, we use a number of institutional variables in the home country that have 
been considered in the literature:  
1. The anti-self-dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008) which measures the legal protection of 
minority shareholders against ―managerial self-dealing‖ and private benefit extraction10; 
2. A common law dummy to identify the legal system (common versus civil law), since common 
law countries are characterized by a stronger legal enforcement;  
3. The accounting standards index, which is produced by the Center for International Financial 
Analysis and Research (1991) and retrieved from La Porta et al. (1998). It measures the quality 
of accounting and disclosure standards and thus the degree of transparency vis-à-vis outside 
investors. Note that the availability of institutional variables confines our dataset to 47 countries. 
 
IV. Empirical evidence 
1. The takeover likelihood 
In this section, we investigate whether foreign firms cross-listed in the US are more likely to 
become targets for acquisitions relative to their domestically listed peers. We use a panel data 
approach to model the probability of becoming a takeover target. Our sample consists of 6,104 
non-US firms, 1,961 of which were targets in acquisitions and 817 of which were cross-listed in 
the US between 1990 and 2008, resulting in a total of 43,146 firm-year observations. The 
                                                 
10
 Data is available on Shleifer's web page: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset 
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dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the acquisition occurs during the firm-year and 0 
otherwise. The general specification is as follows: 
Acquiredit = β0 + β1Exchange-listedit + β2Non-exchange-listedit + β3Firm-level variablesit                          
+ β4Country-level variablesi + εit   
Exchange-listedit and non-exchange-listedit are two dummy variables that equal 1 if firm i is 
cross-listed in year t via exchange or non-exchange listing respectively, and 0 otherwise. 
At the country-level, we use the anti-self-dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for 
shareholder protection in the home country. We also include a dummy variable to indicate 
whether the firm is domiciled in an emerging market.
11
 Emerging market firms may exhibit a 
different takeover likelihood, as these firms are relatively more financially constrained (Lins et 
al., 2005) and operate in a less efficient market for corporate control. To account for potential 
time and firm effects in the data, we include year dummies and estimate robust standard errors 
clustered at the firm-level as recommended by Petersen (2009). 
We estimate four specifications of the takeover likelihood equation and report the estimation 
results in Table 2. The results from the first specification that includes only cross-listing, 
industry, region, and year dummies show a positive and significant effect of the exchange-listing 
on the probability of becoming a target. In contrast, non-exchange listing has a positive but 
insignificant effect on the takeover probability. Specification 2 includes firm-level variables 
expected to influence the takeover probability, while country-level variables are added in 
specification 3. In both specifications 2 and 3, the impact of exchange-listing remains positive 
and significant, while the non-exchange type is still insignificant, corroborating the idea that 
listing on US exchanges makes firms more attractive targets. The other control variables show 
mixed results: Consistent with the evidence, size and Tobin’s Q are negatively related to the 
                                                 
11
 We use the country classification from the World Economic Outlook and include emerging and 
developing economies in the same group. 
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probability of becoming a target, whereas the leverage level significantly increases this 
probability. However, lower growth levels of the target seem to increase the takeover likelihood. 
Finally, our measures of management efficiency (ROE) and corporate liquidity (FCF) show no 
significant effect on the takeover likelihood. 
In specification 3, the positive and significant coefficient of the anti-self-dealing index 
variable suggests that the takeover likelihood increases if the target originates from a stronger 
shareholder protection country. Additionally, belonging to an emerging country significantly 
reduces the likelihood of becoming a target. In the last section of the paper, we perform a 
robustness test that compares the results of separate regressions for emerging and developed 
countries. Specification 4 includes two interaction variables between the difference in 
shareholder protection levels between the US and target countries and both types of cross-listing 
(exchange and non-exchange). The coefficients associated with both interaction variables are not 
statistically significant, suggesting that the impact of cross-listing on the takeover likelihood 
does not vary with the level of shareholder protection in the target country. 
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
Self-selection bias correction 
Following previous studies (e.g., Doidge et al., 2004), we correct for the self-selection bias 
arising from the decision to cross-list using Heckman's (1979) procedure. Disregarding this 
potential problem and using standard statistical methods would produce biased results. 
Heckman's (1979) two-step procedure consists of estimating a probit model for the decision to 
cross-list as a first step, with the dependent variable being equal to 1 for cross-listed firms and 0 
for non-cross-listed firms. The estimated cross-listing probabilities (the fitted values from the 
first-stage probit) are then used to compute the inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda) that is included in 
the main regression as a correction for self-selection in the second stage. 
25 
 
In the first step, the probit regression for the decision to cross-list is modeled as a function of 
firm and country attributes (Doidge et al., 2004). Larger firms with higher growth opportunities 
and more financial constraints are more likely to cross-list. Thus, we use the following firm-level 
variables in the probit regression: the size, measured by the logarithm of market capitalization in 
US dollars; the three-year growth rate of sales, as a proxy for investment opportunities; leverage 
as a proxy for the level of financial constraints that would entice firms to raise equity capital, in 
particular through cross-listing. We also include the ratio of foreign sales to total sales as a 
proxy for the level of firm’s openness to international markets. Moreover, firms from countries 
with weak investor protection seem to voluntarily cross-list in the US with the intention of 
conforming to stringent US regulation (the bonding hypothesis). We therefore include the 
following measures for legal environment and accounting standards presented in the data 
description section: the common law dummy and the accounting standards index. 
The last two columns of Table 2 present the results of the second-step regressions including 
inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda). Interestingly, in both specifications, the coefficient of the exchange-
listing dummy is still significant, suggesting that the relation we found between exchange-listing 
and the takeover likelihood is robust to the self-selection bias. Additionally, the coefficient 
associated with lambda is positive and significant in specification (5), suggesting that the 
correction for self-selection is relevant. 
 
2. The acquisition premium 
In this section, we investigate whether cross-listing on US markets helps target firms extract 
higher takeover premiums. We use a sample of 3,413 transactions for which the acquisition 
premium and firm level data are available. The premium is winsorized at the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 
percentiles to reduce the impact of outliers. 
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2.1. Univariate differences  
In Table 3, we report the means and medians of the explanatory variables for both cross-
listing types (exchange- and non-exchange-listings), for the non-cross-listed control sample as 
well as for the entire sample. We provide tests of differences in means (t-statistics) and medians 
(wilcoxon-z) between the sub-groups on the right-hand side of the Table. 
On average, foreign firms with shares cross-listed on major US exchanges obtain significantly 
higher acquisition premiums, compared to both non-exchange-listed and non-cross-listed firms 
(logarithm premium of 0.302 versus 0.206 and 0.208, respectively). However, there is no 
significant difference in the average acquisition premium between non-exchange-listed and non-
cross-listed foreign firms. The test on medians corroborates this result and confirms our second 
hypothesis: Foreign firms cross-listed on US exchanges extract higher premiums when acquired, 
compared to their non-exchange-listed and non-cross-listed peers. One explanation is that 
exchange-listed firms, being subject to stringent US rules and therefore having better corporate 
governance practices, would require lower post-acquisition restructuring costs, consequently 
increasing the expected synergies and thus the acquisition premium. Alternatively, non-
exchange-listed and non-cross-listed foreign firms, generally subject to weaker disclosure and 
legal standards compared to those in the US, would theoretically require higher restructuring 
costs, resulting in a lower acquisition premium.  
The higher growth level among exchange-listed firms (18.88% on average, 7.3% in median 
value) compared to non-exchange-listed firms (average of 6.6% and median of 4.9%) is 
consistent with the conclusions drawn by previous studies: Cross-listing on US exchanges 
reduces the extent to which insiders and controlling shareholders can engage in expropriation a 
result of compliance with stringent US regulations and hence increases the firm’s ability to 
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generate and exploit growth opportunities (Doidge et al., 2004; Hail and Leuz, 2009). However, 
this conclusion is mitigated when we compare these two sub-groups to the control sample of 
non-cross-listed firms. The latter is characterized by a lower growth rate on average, but this rate 
is not significantly different from that of the exchange-listed firms, whereas it is significantly 
higher compared to that of non-exchange-listed firms. 
We also observe a significantly higher percentage of cross-border deals for cross-listed firms 
as compared to non-cross-listed firms. Within the former sub-group, exchange-listed firms 
exhibit a significantly higher proportion of cross-border deals in comparison to non-cross-listed 
firms. This is consistent with the idea that cross-listing, especially on US exchanges, increases 
the firm's visibility on the international market for corporate control and enlarges its range of 
potential acquirers. 
The subsample of exchange-listed targets is also characterized by a higher percentage of 
contested bids (13.2%) as compared to non-exchange-listed firms (8.1%) and especially to non-
cross-listed firms (6.4%), suggesting that exchange-listed firms are highly attractive targets. 
Furthermore, exchange-listed firms exhibit a lower proportion of hostile takeovers as compared 
to non-exchange-listed firms. This evidence provides some support for the hypothesis that cross-
listing on US exchanges decreases hostile takeover attempts as a result of successful bonding and 
lower private benefits available to managers of these firms. Indeed, managers, acting in 
shareholders’ interests, will not reject value increasing takeover offers. In contrast, managers of 
non-exchange-listed firms would tend to resist or reject takeover offers in order to preserve their 
private benefits, thus inviting hostile takeover attempts.  
Comparing institutional variables in the target home country across the different sub-groups 
leads to the following observations: 
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- The anti-self-dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008) is significantly lower for exchange-listed 
firms as compared to non-exchange-listed and to non-cross-listed firms, in terms of both mean 
and median. In other words, firms that list on US major exchanges are, on average, from countries 
with lower investor protection. This observation is consistent with the bonding hypothesis: 
insiders and controlling shareholders from countries with lower investor protection countries 
commit to enhance the protection of minority shareholders by submitting to stringent US rules 
through a US exchange listing. 
- The common law variable shows the opposite results, i.e. significantly higher legal enforcement 
for exchange-listed firms as compared to non-exchange-listed and non-cross-listed firms. The 
accounting standards index also provides little evidence for the bonding hypothesis with no 
significant difference between exchange- and non-exchange-listed firms. 
*** Insert Table 3 about here ***  
 
2.2. Multivariate analysis 
The main question we address in this section is whether cross-listing in the US has any effect 
on the acquisition premium obtained by cross-listed targets. For this purpose, we estimate the 
following model using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors corrected for clustering 
at the country level:  
Premiumi = β0 + β1Exchange-listedi + β2Non-exchange-listedi + β3Control variablesi                          
+ β4Shareholder protectioni + εi   
Control variables are related to firm- and transaction-level attributes as described previously: 
target size, growth opportunities, cross-border dummy, tender offer dummy, contested bid 
dummy, hostile dummy, percentage toehold, and acquirer's MB ratio. As a measure for 
shareholder protection, we use the anti-self-dealing index of Djankov et al. (2008). 
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We report the estimation results in Table 4. Interestingly, for all five specifications, we find 
that cross-listing on US exchanges, whether listed via ADR programs (Level II or III) or directly 
via common shares, significantly increases the premium obtained by cross-listed targets. This 
increase is of a magnitude of 0.10 in the logarithm of the premium, which translates into an 
average increase of 10.5% in the premium. Cross-listing with non-exchange ADRs (level I or 
Rule 144a) also has a positive but insignificant impact on the acquisition premium. These results 
support the idea that cross-listing on US exchanges increases the attractiveness and the value of 
foreign firms on the market for corporate control.  
In specification 2, we add control variables at the transaction level. The results correspond to 
the expected outcomes and the existing literature: Except for the toehold, all control variables 
(cross-border, tender offer, contested bid, and hostile) show positive and significant coefficients. 
More importantly, the impact of a cross-listing on US exchanges on the takeover premium 
remains significant at the 1% level. In specification 3, we include the market-to-book (MB) ratio 
of the acquirer to control for the willingness of growth firms to overpay for their acquisitions. 
The sample drops to 983 observations due to limitations on acquirers’ firm-level data, since our 
initial sample also includes private acquirers. Contrary to our expectations, the effect of the 
acquirer's MB is negligible, and, even if the sample size drops, the significance and magnitude of 
the cross-listing effect is only slightly modified. Therefore, we conduct the next analysis using 
the entire sample and excluding the acquirer's MB ratio from the regressions. 
Specifications (4) and (5) introduce the impact of the level of shareholder protection in the 
target country on the takeover premium. We use the anti-self-dealing index of Djankov et al. 
(2008) as a measure for the shareholder-protection level. Consistent with the results of Rossi and 
Volpin (2004), we find that shareholder protection in the target country is positively related to 
the acquisition premium at the 10% significance level. As noted by Rossi and Volpin, one 
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possible explanation is that targets subject to tighter regulation have lower cost of capital which 
exacerbates competition among bidders and therefore increases the acquisition premium. 
Furthermore, to account for the portion of the premium attributable to the private benefits that 
the acquirer is expecting to extract from its target, we add the difference between the acquirer 
and target countries’ shareholder protection in specification (4). Control would be more valuable 
for acquirers coming from countries with poor shareholder protection, since they are better able 
to extract private benefits of control. Therefore, we should observe higher acquisition premiums 
for deals involving acquirers from countries with low investor protection. As in Rossi and Volpin 
(2004), we do not find a significant effect for this variable, though it has the expected sign. 
In specification (5), we add two interaction variables between the difference in shareholder 
protection levels between the US and target countries and both types of cross-listing (exchange 
and non-exchange). The overall impact of shareholder protection on the acquisition premium is 
still positive and significant at the 10% level as in the previous specification. The difference in 
shareholder protection levels for non-exchange firms (measured by the second interaction 
variable) has a negative and significant effect on the premium, suggesting that  lower shareholder 
protection in target countries (a higher difference with US standards) is associated with a lower 
premium. For firms cross-listed on US exchanges, however, this variable has the opposite sign, 
which implies that the weaker the legal protection in the target country, the higher the premium. 
This result is interesting and provides support for the bonding hypothesis: The benefit from 
cross-listing in US exchanges measured by the takeover premium is higher for firms from 
countries with poorer investor protection. Cross-listing is viewed as a signal of commitment to 
non-expropriation of minority shareholders. This raises investors’ expectations about future cash 
flows, lowers the firm's cost of capital and improves its ability to generate and exploit growth 
opportunities (Hail and Leuz, 2009). Acquirers perceive cross-listing on US exchanges as a 
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bonding device and are therefore willing to pay more to acquire a less risky firm with higher 
growth prospects. Thus, their valuation is higher for exchange-listed targets, especially those 
coming from poorly regulated countries, while the non-cross-listed and non-exchange-listed 
ADR firms are valued downward.  
*** Insert Table 4 about here *** 
 
3. The impact of SOX 
In this section, we investigate whether SOX has an impact on the takeover likelihood and the 
acquisition premium obtained by foreign targets cross-listed in the US. 
 
3.1. SOX and the takeover likelihood  
To evaluate the effect of SOX on the takeover likelihood, we use the same determinants of the 
takeover likelihood examined previously and include additional dummy variables related to 
SOX. The variable SOX takes the value of 1 for each observation recorded after 2002 and 0 
before. Table 5 reports the estimation results for the entire period as well as for the pre- and post-
SOX periods separately. In specification (1), the post-SOX period is characterized by increased 
takeover activity as shown by the positive and significant coefficient associated with the SOX 
dummy, while the impact of both types of cross-listing after SOX is also positive but statistically 
insignificant. This result does not support our hypothesis that exchange-listed firms become 
more likely targets after SOX as a result of compliance with tighter rules of disclosure and 
governance.  
We also conjecture that compliance with SOX is more challenging for cross-listed firms 
domiciled in countries with weak investor protection and we expect this to make them even more 
attractive relative to their non-cross-listed peers. To examine this proposition, we include in 
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specification 2 the interaction between both types of cross-listing after SOX and the difference in 
shareholder protection between the US and the target home country. The coefficient associated 
with this interaction variable is positive but insignificant for both types of cross-listing, 
suggesting that the takeover likelihood of cross-listed firms is not affected by their home 
regulation even after the enactment of SOX. 
Specifications (3) and (4) report the results of estimating the same model for the pre- and 
post-SOX periods separately. Both periods exhibit a significant and positive impact of cross-
listing on US exchanges on the takeover likelihood, while non-exchange-listing is associated 
with a positive but insignificant effect. Overall, we do not find evidence for a significant 
difference between pre- and post-SOX periods regarding the effect of cross-listing on the 
takeover likelihood. 
*** Insert Table 5 about here *** 
 
3.2. SOX and the takeover premium 
In this section, we investigate whether acquirers attribute a value to complying with SOX by 
comparing the acquisition premium for SOX compliant targets versus non-SOX-compliant 
targets. Table 6 compares average and median acquisition premiums before and after SOX for 
exchange-listed targets (Levels II and III ADRs and direct listings) versus non-exchange-listed 
targets (Level I and Rule 144A ADRs). 
In the pre-SOX period, there is no significant difference in the average and median premium 
between both groups. Interestingly, during the post-SOX period, exchange-listed targets obtain 
significantly higher premiums than non-exchange-listed targets. Furthermore, comparing the 
sub-periods within each group, we notice that the acquisition premium has significantly 
decreased after SOX for non-exchange-listed targets from 0.25 to 0.14 on average. For 
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exchange-listed firms, the average acquisition premium is slightly higher after SOX but the 
difference is not statistically significant (0.29 versus 0.31). Overall, these results are consistent 
with our expectations: Exchange-listed firms, being subject to the stringent disclosure and 
governance rules imposed by SOX and therefore having better internal control systems, would 
require lower post-acquisition costs, thus increasing expected synergies and the premium paid by 
the acquirer. On the other hand, non-exchange-listed foreign targets, which are subject to their 
local accounting and governance standards, would require higher acquisition costs thus resulting 
in a lower takeover premium. 
*** Insert Table 6 about here *** 
In Table 7, we explore the impact of the enactment of SOX on the acquisition premium in a 
multivariate context. Consistent with our hypothesis, the regression over the entire period 
(column 1) shows that SOX-compliant, cross-listed firms (measured by the interaction variable 
between the SOX dummy and exchange-listed firms) obtain significantly higher premiums after 
SOX came into effect, while this premium is reduced (but not significantly) for non-SOX-
compliant cross-listed firms (measured by the second interaction variable). This result suggests 
that acquirers perceive some benefits from SOX and are willing to pay more after SOX to buy a 
transparent company with an efficient internal control system. Column (2) includes interactions 
between both cross-listing types and the difference in anti-self-dealing levels between the US 
and the target country. The results show that, after SOX, exchange-listed firms from countries 
with lower investor protection than US standards are associated with higher takeover premiums. 
We obtain similar results when estimating the pre- and post-SOX periods separately in columns 
(3) and (4). In addition, the impact of a US exchange listing on the takeover premium is still 
positive and significant at the 1% level for both periods.  
*** Insert Table 7 about here *** 
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4. Robustness tests 
In this section, we conduct a set of robustness tests to provide further support to our findings.  
4.1. Duration analysis 
One limitation of the logistic regression used to examine the takeover likelihood is that it 
ignores the effect of time. Indeed, the takeover likelihood may differ as time progresses. In 
addition, data censoring could also bias the estimation. Right censoring arises when firms have 
not experienced the event (the acquisition) by the end of the period under study.
12
 Indeed, the 
acquisition could occur after this period but is not observed. The objective of our first set of 
robustness tests is to examine the acquisition of cross-listed firms using survival analysis which 
handles both limitations.  
We use Cox (1972) proportional-hazard model which allows us to relate the acquisition event 
to time-varying firm attributes (called covariates in the survival analysis). One advantage of Cox 
model is that it does not require any assumption regarding the shape of the underlying survival 
distribution (the baseline hazard). This model is widely used in survival analysis. For instance, 
Wheelock and Wilson (2000) use Cox’s methodology to model the hazard of bank failure and 
acquisition, while Doidge et al. (2009b) apply it to predict the decision of cross-listing on US 
exchanges.  
Like panel data models, hazard models deal with repeated observations over time on the same 
individual; however, they explicitly incorporate information about the timing of the event and 
track events over time to assess the influence of explanatory variables on their occurrence. While 
logistic regressions describe the event probability during the entire sample period, Cox 
regression models the instantaneous event likelihood at a given point in time. This model allows 
                                                 
12
 Censoring also arises when the firm is dropped out of the sample due to missing data. 
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us to assess the probability of acquisition at any point in time, given that the firm has not been a 
target up to this time (called hazard rate).  
We estimate Cox model by maximizing the partial likelihood function. With our panel setting 
(used in the takeover likelihood regressions), each firm is observed Ti different times, with either 
acquisition or right censoring taking place at time Ti. The first observation date differs across 
firms. The event hazard depends on a set of covariates X: 
)exp()(),( 0 XthXth   
 
Where h0(t) is the survival time distribution (i.e. the baseline hazard function); β is the vector of 
parameters to estimate; X is the vector of explanatory variables. 
As covariates for the hazard models, we use the same set of firm- and country-level variables 
employed in logistic regressions. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the 
firm level. Estimates of the Cox hazard model, shown in Table 8, provide further support for our 
findings: In all specifications, exchange-listing is associated with a positive and significant effect 
on the takeover likelihood, whereas non-exchange-listing does not have a significant impact on 
this likelihood. The other variables exhibit effects and significance levels similar to those 
reported for the logit regressions, except for the size effect which becomes insignificant and the 
foreign sales ratio which becomes positive and significant, indicating a positive relation between 
the takeover hazard and openness to international markets. 
*** Insert Table 8 about here *** 
 
4.2. Developed versus emerging countries 
To provide additional robustness to our results, we examine whether the cross-listing effect 
varies with the economic development level of the target firm’s home country. Our previous 
results indicate that emerging markets are associated with a lower takeover likelihood. This 
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result is likely to reflect the lower volume of M&As observed in these countries as compared to 
developed ones. Data limitations regarding financial statements for emerging market firms could 
bias the results toward a higher takeover likelihood, as more M&As are observed among 
developed countries. Similarly, the results on the acquisition premium could be driven by 
characteristics prevailing in developed markets, since our sample is mainly composed of 
developed market firms because of broader SDC coverage for these firms (3,062 developed 
market firms versus only 334 emerging market firms for which the takeover premium is 
available).  
Furthermore, motives behind cross-listing could differ between emerging and developed 
market firms. Emerging countries are generally characterized by lower investor protection, more 
financial constraints, and less efficient markets for corporate control. Firms in these countries 
have more incentives to cross-list in the US in order to overcome these barriers. They may cross-
list with the intention of seeking a buyer for the firm and higher bids. As a result, the effect of 
cross-listing on the takeover likelihood and premium could be more pronounced among 
emerging market firms. 
To test the robustness of our results with the economic development of the home county, we 
run previous regressions for emerging and developed countries separately. Tables 9 and 10 
depict the results for the takeover likelihood and premium respectively. Exchange-listing seems 
to have a more pronounced effect on both the takeover likelihood and the premium for emerging 
countries relative to developed countries. Testing the difference in exchange-listing coefficients 
between the two subsamples indicates indeed that the cross-listing's positive effect on both the 
premium and the takeover likelihood is significantly stronger for emerging markets
13
. This 
                                                 
13
 t-statistics for coefficient differences in the takeover premium regressions range between 2.29 and 4.77 
across specifications. Wald chi-square statistics for coefficient differences in the takeover likelihood 
regressions range between 8.22 and 11.47. 
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evidence is consistent with the idea that firms cross-list in order to overcome their domestic 
market constraints. Emerging market firms appear to benefit more from cross-listing on US 
exchanges. 
*** Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here *** 
 
4.3. Additional robustness checks 
Endogeneity issues: One potential concern in our analysis is that the cross-listing variable 
may be endogenous, resulting in biased and inconsistent estimates. Indeed, some unobserved 
factors explaining the takeover premium may also determine the cross-listing status. To address 
this problem, we use an instrumental variable estimation. Specifically, we estimate a two-stage 
least-squares regression for the takeover premium using economic proximity as an instrument for 
the cross-listing dummy. In our choice of instrument, we rely upon the results of Sarkissian and 
Schill (2004) suggesting that the cross-listing decision is dominated by proximity considerations, 
namely geographic, economic, cultural, and industrial proximity. Economic closeness between 
countries is highly correlated with the cross-listing dummy and uncorrelated with the takeover 
premium, which makes it a good instrumental variable candidate. Economic closeness, obtained 
from Sarkissian and Schill (2004), is defined as the percentage of a country's exports going to the 
US. Tests of the relevance and the excludability (exogeneity) of this instrumental variable 
confirm its validity (F-test = 51; p-value ≈ 0).  
Table 11 displays the results of the instrumental variable estimation. The results of the first-
stage regression (unreported but available from the authors) confirm that economic proximity is 
a good determinant of the exchange-listing status. The second-stage regression in column (1) 
validates our previous results: the instrumented value of exchange-listing is still positively 
related to the takeover premium at the 1% significance level. We repeat the same analysis for 
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non-exchange-listing as the endogenous variable instrumented with economic proximity and find 
no significant effect of this cross-listing type on the takeover premium (column 2). 
*** Insert Table 11 about here *** 
 
Country weights in the sample: To further test the robustness of our results, we re-estimate 
the takeover premium regressions using weighted least squares, where the weights are the 
inverse of the number of observations in each country. This correction allows the different 
countries to exert the same impact in the regressions. Estimation results in Panel A of Table 12 
corroborate our main conclusions: Exchange-listing has a significantly positive effect on the 
takeover premium while the impact of non-exchange-listing is sometimes negative but marginal 
in all specifications. 
One related concern is that the results might be driven by transactions involving UK targets 
which constitute 25% of our sample. Benefits from a US cross-listing are lower for UK firms, 
which are already operating in high corporate governance environment and active takeover 
market. Consequently, the cross-listing effect might be insignificant for UK firms. Moreover, 
according to Rossi and Volpin (2004), UK (and US) targets obtain significantly higher takeover 
premiums than other countries. This may influence the results because of the relatively higher 
concentration of UK firms in our sample. We replicate our analysis excluding these firms and 
find similar results (Panel B of Table 12). 
*** Insert Table 12 about here *** 
In summary, the results of our robustness tests confirm our predictions that exchange-listing 
has a positive effect on the takeover likelihood and premium, while the impact of non-exchange-
listing is marginal. 
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V. Conclusion  
Using an extensive sample of M&As involving non-US targets, we examine target 
shareholders’ gains from a US cross-listing preceding the takeover. While a US listing is 
expected to reduce controlling shareholders' private benefits owing to increased disclosure and 
monitoring, it will also increase the value of their stake and allow them to extract a higher 
premium when selling the company. We investigate this proposition and find that exchange-
listed firms do indeed obtain a higher takeover premium as compared to their non-cross-listed 
peers. This result suggests that divesting shareholders could use a US listing to overcome the 
constraints prevailing in their domestic markets and to reduce the cost of transferring control. 
Examining the impact of home-country regulation, we find that exchange-listed targets from 
countries with weak legal protection obtain higher premiums. This result is consistent with the 
bonding hypothesis, that is, the benefit from cross-listing on US exchanges as measured by the 
takeover premium is higher for firms from countries with poorer investor protection. Acquirers 
perceive cross-listing on US exchanges as a bonding mechanism to improve corporate 
governance and are therefore willing to pay more to acquire less risky firms with higher growth 
prospects relative to their non-cross-listed peers. 
Furthermore, we find that cross-listed firms are more likely takeover targets, supporting the 
idea that cross-listing increases the attractiveness of foreign firms on the market for corporate 
control. This result is attributed to the various benefits gained from cross-listing on US markets: 
better corporate governance, enhanced visibility, improved transparency, and lower information 
asymmetry vis-à-vis acquirers. Consequently, cross-listing increases the exposure of foreign 
firms to international markets, thus attracting a wider range of potential acquirers. This evidence 
is robust to different specifications and to correction of the self-selection bias. Additional 
robustness tests, including survival analysis, further support this finding. 
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Finally, we investigate the impact of the adoption of SOX on M&As, an area still unexplored. 
While we find no evidence supporting that SOX affects the acquisition likelihood of cross-listed 
firms, our data show that exchange-listed firms obtain significantly higher takeover premiums 
after SOX. This result is consistent with the proposition that these firms—since they conform to 
SOX’s stringent disclosure and governance rules and therefore have better internal control 
systems—would require lower acquisition costs (in due diligence, post-acquisition restructuring, 
etc.), thus increasing expected synergies and the premium paid by the acquirer. Acquirers seem 
to value SOX-compliance and are willing to pay more to acquire a transparent firm with reduced 
uncertainty. For target shareholders, whether this higher premium outweighs the compliance 
costs remains unclear and requires further research. 
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Appendix 1  Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variables Definition Source 
Firm-level variables 
Size Log market value of the target 4 weeks before the 
M&A's announcement, or at the beginning of the 
firm-year for panel regressions (in US$ million) 
SDC 
Worldscope 
Growth  Sales growth, measured by the 3-year geometric 
average of annual growth in sales 
SDC 
Worldscope 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets Worldscope 
Tobin’s Q (book value of assets + market capitalization - book 
value of equity)/book value of assets 
Worldscope 
Foreign sales The ratio of foreign sales to total sales Worldscope 
ROE The ratio of net income to book value of equity Worldscope 
FCF The ratio of free cash-flows to total assets Worldscope 
Home country variables 
Common law Dummy = 1 if the country follows the English 
Common Law; and 0 otherwise 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
Anti-self-dealing An index that measures the degree of investor 
protection against "managerial self-dealing" 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
 
Accounting 
standards Index 
Created by the Center for International Financial 
Analysis and Research to rate the quality of annual 
reports on their disclosure of accounting information 
La Porta et al. (1998) 
 
Emerging Dummy = 1 if the firm is originated from an 
emerging or developing country, and 0 otherwise 
World Economic 
Outlook classification 
M&A transaction variables 
Acquisition 
premium 
Natural logarithm of the bid price as a % of the 
closing price of the target 4 weeks before the 
announcement, and winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 % 
SDC 
Acquirer MB Equity market-to-book ratio of the bidder computed 
4 weeks before the announcement 
SDC 
Contested bid Dummy = 1 if there are multiple bidders, and 0 
otherwise 
SDC 
Cross-border  Dummy = 1 if the target country differs from the 
acquirer country, and 0 otherwise 
SDC 
Hostile Dummy = 1 if the transaction is classified as 
unsolicited or hostile, and 0 otherwise 
SDC  
Tender offer Dummy = 1 if the takeover involves a tender offer, 
and 0 otherwise  
SDC 
Toehold % of target equity owned by the acquirer prior to 
acquisition 
SDC 
Cross-listing variables 
Exchange-listed Dummy = 1 if the firm is cross-listed via exchange-
listed ADRs (Levels II and III) or direct listing 
(common shares), and 0 otherwise 
Depositary banks, CRSP, 
Exchanges web sites 
Non-exchange-
listed 
Dummy = 1 if the firm is cross-listed via non-
exchange-listed ADRs (Level I or Rule 144a), and 0 
otherwise 
Depositary banks, CRSP, 
Exchanges web sites 
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FIGURE 1 
Total Cross-Listings and Acquisitions by Country 
This figure exhibits the number of total cross-listings made by foreign firms in the US over the 1990-2008 period in 
declining rank for the top 20 countries. We include all cross-listing types: exchange and non-exchange ADRs and 
direct cross-listing. For each country, we report the proportion of firms acquired over the same period. 
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TABLE 1 
Cross-Listed Firms and Their Acquisition Status 
This table presents the proportion of acquisitions among cross-listed firms according to the cross-listing type. The 
entire universe of cross-listed firms between 1990 and 2008 (as reported by the main depositary banks) is 
considered, whether ADRs are sponsored or not, provided that the listing date and country of origin are available. 
The Exchange listing type includes Level II and III ADR listings and direct listing.  
 
Panel A    Acquisition status of cross-listed firms by listing type over the entire period 
Listing type 
Number of 
observations 
% of total 
Acquired over the entire 
period 
Acquired within 5 years from 
the cross-listing 
Number % Number %  
Exchange 1 944 40% 576 29.6% 336 17.3% 
Level I  2 124 43% 341 16.1% 174 8.2% 
Rule 144a   831 17% 188 22.6% 85 10.2% 
Total 4 899 100% 1 105 22.6% 595 12.2% 
 
Panel B    Acquisition status of cross-listed firms by year and listing type 
Listing type Exchange Level I Rule 144a 
Listing 
year 
Number 
of  
listings 
Acquired over the 
entire period 
Number 
of  
listings 
Acquired over the 
entire period 
Number 
of  
listings 
Acquired over the 
entire period 
Number % Number % Number % 
1990 52 14 27 71 40 56 19 12 63 
1991 67 28 42 67 23 34 20 5 25 
1992 88 35 40 59 29 49 26 9 35 
1993 147 57 39 87 20 23 31 8 26 
1994 148 59 40 131 42 32 129 41 32 
1995 134 46 34 101 27 27 57 16 28 
1996 173 64 37 107 34 32 76 25 33 
1997 187 61 33 96 22 23 67 24 36 
1998 132 40 30 83 15 18 46 12 26 
1999 102 34 33 83 19 23 43 6 14 
2000 189 59 31 74 16 22 23 6 26 
2001 85 24 28 86 15 17 20 3 15 
2002 46 10 22 75 10 13 17 2 12 
2003 55 10 18 48 7 15 29 2 7 
2004 69 15 22 78 11 14 25 6 24 
2005 82 14 17 46 2 4 47 6 13 
2006 69 5 7 53 6 11 51 2 4 
2007 87 1 1 59 3 5 64 3 5 
2008 32 0 0 720 0 0 41 0 0 
Total 1944 576 30% 2124 341 16% 831 188 23% 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Panel C    Acquisition status of cross-listed firms by country and listing type 
Listing type Exchange Level I Rule 144a 
Country 
Number 
of  
listings 
Acquired over the 
entire period 
Number 
of  
listings 
Acquired over the 
entire period 
Number 
of  
listings 
Acquired over the 
entire period 
Number % Number % Number % 
Argentina 29 14 48% 11 5 45% 17 3 18% 
Australia 37 10 27% 225 38 17% 10 1 10% 
Austria 0 0 0% 31 10 32% 6 3 50% 
Bahamas 3 1 33% 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 
Bahrain 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 2 0 0% 
Belgium 7 4 57% 21 1 5% 1 0 0% 
Bermuda 87 20 23% 7 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Bolivia 0 0 0% 5 1 20% 0 0 0% 
Brazil 52 17 33% 88 18 20% 45 5 11% 
British Virgin Islands 3 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Canada 455 172 38% 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 
Cayman Islands 20 2 10% 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Channel Islands 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 2 0 0% 
Chile 38 17 45% 4 0 0% 8 2 25% 
China 104 8 8% 69 4 6% 10 0 0% 
Colombia 3 1 33% 8 2 25% 10 4 40% 
Croatia 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 4 1 25% 
Cyprus 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Czech Republic 2 0 0% 1 1 100% 5 3 60% 
Denmark 7 2 29% 17 1 6% 1 1 100% 
Dominican Republic 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 0 0 0% 
Ecuador 0 0 0% 2 0 0% 3 1 33% 
Egypt 0 0 0% 3 1 33% 13 2 15% 
Estonia 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 2 0 0% 
Finland 5 2 40% 23 2 9% 6 1 17% 
France 33 10 30% 85 8 9% 14 6 43% 
Georgia 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 6 0 0% 
Germany 34 8 24% 75 11 15% 10 2 20% 
Ghana 1 1 100% 0 0 0% 1 1 100% 
Greece 9 3 33% 17 0 0% 7 0 0% 
Hong Kong 32 9 28% 209 35 17% 3 0 0% 
Hungary 1 0 0% 6 0 0% 9 3 33% 
India 19 1 5% 4 0 0% 120 25 21% 
Indonesia 6 2 33% 9 3 33% 3 0 0% 
Ireland 36 13 36% 24 3 13% 4 0 0% 
Israel 124 32 26% 14 0 0% 3 0 0% 
Italy 22 11 50% 38 3 8% 16 2 13% 
Jamaica 0 0 0% 4 2 50% 0 0 0% 
Japan 17 3 18% 199 9 5% 7 1 14% 
Jersey 1 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 
Jordan 1 1 100% 2 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 11 0 0% 
Korea (South) 19 6 32% 7 1 14% 70 17 24% 
Kuwait 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Latvia 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 1 100% 
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Panel C  (Continued)   Acquisition status of cross-listed firms by country and listing type 
Listing type Exchange Level I Rule 144a 
Country 
Number 
of  
listings 
Acquired over the 
entire period 
Number 
of  
listings 
Acquired over the 
entire period 
Number 
of  
listings 
Acquired over the 
entire period 
Number % Number % Number % 
Lebanon 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 4 0 0% 
Lithuania 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 3 0 0% 
Luxembourg 15 9 60% 9 1 11% 4 1 25% 
Malawi 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Malaysia 0 0 0% 17 4 24% 0 0 0% 
Malta 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 1 100% 
Marshall Islands 27 0 0% 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 
Mexico 57 18 32% 66 15 23% 40 13 33% 
Morocco 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Netherlands 61 22 36% 36 9 25% 6 1 17% 
New Zealand 13 6 46% 26 0 0% 0 0 0% 
Nigeria 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 3 0 0% 
Norway 10 4 40% 38 13 34% 6 3 50% 
Oman 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Pakistan 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 8 0 0% 
Panama 3 0 0% 2 0 0% 0 0 0% 
Peru 3 2 67% 5 0 0% 6 1 17% 
Philippines 3 1 33% 8 1 13% 13 4 31% 
Poland 0 0 0% 4 1 25% 17 6 35% 
Portugal 3 2 67% 18 1 6% 4 2 50% 
Puerto Rico 4 1 25% 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 
Qatar 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 2 0 0% 
Romania 5 1 20% 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Russia 6 1 17% 64 11 17% 74 8 11% 
Singapore 9 5 56% 66 10 15% 3 0 0% 
Slovakia 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 0 0 0% 
Slovenia 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 1 100% 
South Africa 17 6 35% 83 14 17% 18 8 44% 
South Korea 2 0 0% 0 0 0% 4 3 75% 
Spain 9 3 33% 34 5 15% 5 3 60% 
Sri Lanka 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 2 0 0% 
Sweden 17 7 41% 47 11 23% 6 3 50% 
Switzerland 28 7 25% 42 2 5% 6 1 17% 
Taiwan 13 1 8% 1 0 0% 77 14 18% 
Thailand 0 0 0% 22 4 18% 3 0 0% 
Trinidad 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 0 0 0% 
Tunisia 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Turkey 2 2 100% 22 0 0% 23 7 30% 
Ukraine 0 0 0% 11 1 9% 5 0 0% 
United Arab Emirates 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 
United Kingdom 208 96 46% 268 76 28% 35 20 57% 
Uruguay 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Venezuela 5 3 60% 22 3 14% 8 3 38% 
Zimbabwe 0 0 0% 0 0 0% 1 0 0% 
Total 1788 576 32% 2124 341 16% 831 188 23% 
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TABLE 2  Determinants of the Takeover Likelihood 
This table reports logistic regressions for a sample of 6,104 non-US firms over the 1990-2008 period, for a total of 
43,146 firm-year observations. The dependent variable equals one if the acquisition occurs during the firm-year. 
Explanatory variables related to the cross-listing are: Exchange-listed, a dummy variable to identify ADRs listed on 
an organized exchange (Level II and III) and direct listings via common shares; Non-exchange-listed, a dummy 
variable to identify ADRs listed over the counter (Level I) or via Rule 144a. Firm-level variables, measured at the 
beginning of the year, are: Size, the logarithm of market capitalization; Growth, the 3-year growth rate of sales; 
Leverage, the ratio of total debt to total assets; Tobin’s Q, computed as (book value of assets + market capitalization 
- book value of equity)/book value of assets; Foreign sales, the ratio of foreign sales to total sales; ROE, the ratio of 
net income to book value of equity; FCF, the ratio of free cash-flows to total assets. Country-level variables are: 
Emerging, equals one if the firm is originated from an emerging country; Anti-self-dealing, an index from Djankov 
et al. (2008) measuring the degree of legal protection of minority shareholders; Diff anti-SD(US-Target), the difference in 
the anti-self-dealing levels between the US and target countries; Accounting, an index from Laporta et al. (1998) 
measuring the quality of accounting standards; Common law, a dummy variable for the legal system (common vs. 
civil law). Lambda is the inverse Mill's ratio in the Heckman model. Year, region and industry dummies (at one-
digit SIC code level) are included in all regressions. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the 
firm level. z-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
         Heckman correction 
 Logit (1) Logit (2) Logit (3) Logit (4) Probit Logit (5) Logit (6) 
Exchange-listed 0.196 ** 0.340 *** 0.355 *** 0.355 ***   0.298 *** 0.361 *** 
 (1.94)  (3.05)  (3.25)  (3.26)    (2.85)  (3.34)  
Non-exchange-listed 0.047  0.092  0.121  0.121    0.099  0.129  
 (0.49)  (0.94)  (1.25)  (1.25)    (1.02)  (1.32)  
Size   -0.117 ** -0.119 ** -0.119 ** 0.330 ***   -0.075  
   (-1.94)  (-2.1)  (-2.09)  (3.12)    (-0.78)  
Growth   -0.509 *** -0.540 *** -0.540 *** -0.003    -0.540 *** 
   (-6.22)  (-6.67)  (-6.67)  (-0.25)    (-6.67)  
Leverage   0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.000 **   0.004 *** 
   (7.16)  (7.14)  (7.14)  (2.04)    (6.95)  
Tobin’s Q   -0.188 *** -0.215 *** -0.215 ***     -0.215 *** 
   (-6.84)  (-7.43)  (-7.43)      (-7.42)  
Foreign sales   -0.000  -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 0.001 ***   -0.002 ** 
   (-0.38)  (-2.64)  (-2.64)   (30.81)    (-2.19)  
ROE   0.003  0.002  0.002      0.002  
   (0.82)  (0.82)  (0.82)      (0.82)  
FCF   -0.003  -0.003  -0.003      -0.003  
   (-1.33)  (-1.45)  (-1.45)      (-1.45)  
Emerging     -1.166 *** -1.166 ***     -1.159 *** 
     (-11.62)  (-11.61)      (-11.46)  
Anti-self-dealing     0.830 *** 0.830 ***     0.830 *** 
      (10.56)  (10.15)      (10.56)  
Diff anti-SD(US-Target) 
 × Exchange-listed 
      -0.004 
(-0.01) 
       
  Diff anti-SD(US-Target)               
 × Non-exchange-listed 
     -0.002 
(-0.01)    
        
Accounting         -0.011 **     
         (-2.33)      
Common law         0.132 *     
         (1.67)      
Lambda           0.564 *** 0.224   
           (2.77)  (0.56)  
Pseudo R² 4.12%  5.15%     6.60%     6.60%    11.80%  4.18%    6.61%  
χ
2
  618  739   957     958   1 657  627     958  
Prob > χ
2
  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000    0.000  0.000   0.000  
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 3  
Differences between Exchange-Listed, Non-Exchange-Listed and Non-Cross-Listed Target Firms 
This table reports the means and medians of the different variables for exchange and non-exchange-listed targets and 
for the non-cross-listed targets. The sample consists of 3,413 non-US targets, 447 of which were cross-listed in the 
US at the moment of the acquisition, over the 1990-2008 period. Exchange-listed are firms listed on an organized 
exchange via Levels II or III ADRs or via direct listings by common shares; Non-exchange-listed are firms listed via 
Level I or Rule 144a ADRS. The t-test statistic for differences in means and Wilcoxon-z statistic for differences in 
medians between the 3 subsamples are reported in the right-hand side of the table. Variables at the firm level are: 
Target size, the logarithm of the target’s market capitalization four weeks before the M&A's announcement; 
Growth, the 3-year growth rate of the target's sales, measured at the year-end preceding the announcement. 
Variables at the transaction level are: the natural logarithm of the takeover premium, measured as the percentage of 
the offer price to the closing price of the target four weeks before the M&A’s announcement. Cross-border, a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the target country differs from the acquirer country and 0 otherwise; Tender offer, a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal involves a tender offer and 0 otherwise; Contested bid, a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the number of bidders is greater than 1 and 0 otherwise; Hostile, a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the transaction is classified as hostile or unsolicited and zero otherwise; Toehold, the percentage of the target's 
shares owned by the acquirer at the announcement. Variables at the country level are: Anti-self-dealing, an index 
from Djankov et al. (2008) measuring the degree of legal protection of minority shareholders; Common law, a 
dummy variable to identify the legal origin (common versus civil law); Accounting, an index retrieved from La 
Porta et al. (1998) and measuring the quality of accounting standards.  
 
 All firms Exchange-
listed  
Non-
exchange-
listed  
Non-cross-
listed  
Exchange  vs. 
Non-
exchange 
Exchange vs. 
Non-cross-
listed 
Non-exchange 
vs. non-cross-
listed 
Variables Mean Mean Mean Mean t-statistic t-statistic t-statistic 
 (Median) (Median) (Median) (Median) (Wilcoxon z) (Wilcoxon z) (Wilcoxon z) 
Log Premium 0.214 0.302 0.206 0.208 3.72 *** 4.75 *** -0.10  
 (0.214) (0.277) (0.207) (0.208)  (3.99) *** (4.64) *** (-0.53)  
Target size 5.00 6.81 6.67 4.74 0.71  16.38 *** 14.09 *** 
 (4.87) (6.81) (6.85) (4.66) (0.51)  (14.16) *** (13.63) *** 
Growth 14.60 18.88 6.60 14.92 3.95 *** 1.34  -5.00 *** 
 (7.09) (7.29) (4.91) (7.38) (2.97) *** (0.86)  (-3.41) *** 
Cross-border 0.35 0.58 0.45 0.32 2.73 *** 7.61 *** 3.93 *** 
 (0.00) (1.00) (0.00) (0.00) (2.71) *** (7.54) *** (3.92) *** 
Tender offer 0.58 0.51 0.62 0.59 -2.49 ** -2.35 ** 1.03  
 (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (-2.48) ** (-2.35) ** (1.03)  
Contested bid 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.06 1.75 * 2.88 *** 0.93  
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (1.76) * (3.81) *** (1.03)  
Hostile 0.05 0.09 0.15 0.04 -2.07 ** 2.67 *** 4.91 *** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) -2.04 ** 3.82 *** 8.31 *** 
Toehold 9.66 6.17 11.86 9.74 -3.99 *** -3.51 *** 1.92 * 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -4.88 *** -3.90 *** 2.48 ** 
Anti-self-dealing  0.66 0.62 0.66 0.66 -1.87 * -2.50 ** 0.06  
 (0.64) (0.64) (0.76) (0.64) (-2.39) ** (-2.48) ** (0.27)  
Common law 0.56 0.66 0.58 0.55 1.79 * 3.11 *** 0.85   
 (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.00) (1.78) * (3.11) *** (0.85)   
Accounting 71.22 70.69 70.01 71.35 -0.78  -1.09   -2.02 ** 
 (74) (74) (74) (74.00) (-0.84)  (-1.51)   (-0.61)   
N 3413 212 235 2966       
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4   
The Impact of Cross-Listing on the Takeover Premium 
 
This table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 3,413 non-US targets, 447 of which were cross-listed in the US at 
the moment of the acquisition, over the 1990-2008 period. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
takeover premium, measured as the percentage of the offer price to the closing price of the target four weeks before 
the M&A’s announcement. Explanatory variables related to the cross-listing are: Exchange-listed, a dummy 
variable to identify ADRs listed on an organized exchange (Level II and III) and direct listings via common shares; 
Non-exchange-listed, a dummy variable to identify ADRs listed over the counter (Level I) or via Rule 144a. 
Explanatory variables at the country level are: Emerging, equals 1 for target firms originated from emerging countries 
and 0 otherwise; Anti-self-dealing, an index from Djankov et al. (2008) measuring the degree of legal protection of 
minority shareholders; Diff anti-SD(Acquirer-Target) ; Diff anti-SD(US-Target), the differences in anti-self-dealing levels 
between the acquirer and target countries and between the US and the target country, respectively. Control variables 
at the firm level are: Target size, the logarithm of the target’s market capitalization four weeks before the M&A's 
announcement; Growth, the 3-years growth rate of the target's sales, measured at the year-end preceding the 
announcement. Control variables at the transaction level are: Cross-border, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
target country differs from the acquirer country and 0 otherwise; Tender offer, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
deal involves a tender offer and 0 otherwise; Contested bid, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the number of bidders 
is greater than 1 and 0 otherwise; Hostile, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is classified as hostile or 
unsolicited and 0 otherwise; Toehold, the percentage of target's shares owned by the acquirer at the announcement; 
Acquirer MB, the market-to-book ratio of the acquirer four weeks before the announcement. Year and industry 
dummies (at one-digit SIC code level) are included in all regressions but are not reported. Robust standard errors are 
used and corrected for clustering at the country level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
      (1)       (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)  
Exchange-listed 0.109 *** 0.097 *** 0.086 ** 0.103 *** 0.089 *** 
 (2.87)  (2.97)  (2.49)  (3.34)  (4.83)  
Non-exchange-listed 0.019  0.010  0.006  0.000  0.003  
 (1.11)  (0.62)  (0.2)  (0.03)  (0.28)  
Target Size -0.010 * -0.015 *** -0.010 * -0.012 ** -0.012 ** 
 (-1.74)  (-3.13)  (-1.73)  (-2.69)  (-2.63)  
Growth 0.001 ** 0.000 ** 0.000  0.000 ** 0.000 ** 
 (2.02)  (2.51)  (1.29)  (2.41)  (2.48)  
Cross-border   0.074 *** 0.084 *** 0.076 *** 0.075 *** 
   (4.64)  (3.83)  (4.83)  (5)  
Tender offer   0.141 *** 0.086 *** 0.135 *** 0.132 *** 
   (8.44)  (4.11)  (7.33)  (7.16)  
Contested bid   0.101 *** 0.174 *** 0.101 *** 0.101 *** 
   (4.62)  (5.07)  (4.86)  (4.85)  
Hostile   0.061 *** 0.035  0.057 *** 0.059 *** 
   (3.64)  (0.68)  (3.38)  (3.61)  
Toehold   -0.170 *** -0.223 *** -0.158 *** -0.163 *** 
   (-4.49)  (-4.72)  (-4.94)  (-4.94)  
Acquirer MB     0.000      
     (-1.26)      
Emerging       -0.000    
       (-0.01)    
Anti-self-dealing       0.077 * 0.090 * 
       (1.72)  (1.84)  
Diff anti-SD(Acquirer-Target)       -0.012    
       (-0.37)    
Diff anti-SD(US-Target) 
 × Exchange-listed 
        
0.281 
(2.52) 
** 
Diff anti-SD(US-Target) 
× Non-exchange-listed 
        
-0.098 
(-2.06) 
** 
R² 6.11%  15.67%  18.20%  16.24%  16.49%  
N observations 3413  3408  983  3360  3396  
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
53 
 
TABLE 5  SOX and the Takeover Likelihood 
 
This table reports logistic regressions for a sample of 6,104 non-US firms over the 1990-2008 period, for a total of    
43,146 firm-year observations. The dependent variable takes the value of one if the acquisition occurs during the firm-
year. Explanatory variables related to the cross-listing are: Exchange-listed, a dummy variable to identify ADRs listed on 
an organized exchange (Level II and III) and direct listings via common shares; Non-exchange-listed, a dummy variable to 
identify ADRs listed over the counter (Level I) or via Rule 144a. Firm-level variables, all measured at the beginning of 
the year, are: Size, the logarithm of market capitalization; Growth, the 3-year growth rate of sales; Leverage, the ratio of 
total debt to total assets; Tobin’s Q, computed as (book value of assets + market capitalization - book value of 
equity)/book value of assets; Foreign sales, the ratio of foreign sales to total sales; ROE, the ratio of net income to book 
value of equity; FCF, the ratio of free cash-flows to total assets. Country-level variables are: Emerging, equals 1 for 
firms originated from emerging countries and 0 otherwise; Anti-self-dealing, an index from Djankov et al. (2008) 
measuring the degree of legal protection of minority shareholders; Diff anti-SD(US-Target), the difference in the anti-self-
dealing levels between the US and target countries. SOX is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 after 2002. Year, 
region, and industry dummies (at one-digit SIC code level) are included in all regressions. Standard errors are robust and 
corrected for clustering at the firm level. z-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
 Entire Period : 1990-2008 
Pre-SOX 
1990-2001 
Post-SOX 
2003-2008 
      Logit (1)       Logit (2)        Logit (3)       Logit (4) 
Exchange-listed 0.242 * 0.348 *** 0.314  * 0.328 ** 
 (1.72) (3.17)  (1.83)  (1.94)  
Non-exchange-listed -0.019 0.120  0.081  0.233  
 (-0.14) (1.23)  (0.55)  (1.53)  
Size -0.128 ** -0.121 ** -0.349  * -0.042  
 (-2.15) (-2.13)  (-1.78)  (-0.74)  
Growth -0.538 *** -0.540 *** -0.768  *** -0.401 *** 
 (-6.65) (-6.67)  (-5.24)  (-4.11)  
Leverage 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.003  * 0.003 *** 
 (7.2) (7.1)  (1.79)  (4.76)  
Tobin’s Q -0.215 *** -0.215 *** -0.250  *** -0.168 *** 
 (-7.43) (-7.42)  (-5.03)  (-4.32)  
Foreign sales -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.003  *** -0.001  
 (-2.63) (-2.63)  (-2.8)  (-0.61)  
ROE 0.002 0.002  0.003  0.001  
 (0.82) (0.83)  (0.81)  (0.2)  
FCF -0.003 -0.003  -0.005  -0.011 * 
 (-1.44) (-1.46)  (-1.05)  (-1.66)  
Emerging -1.167 *** -1.169 *** -1.370  *** -1.026 *** 
 (-11.63) (-11.63)  (-6.76)  (-7.97)  
Anti-self-dealing 0.830 *** 0.844 *** 0.968  *** 0.543 *** 
 (10.57) (10.54)  (7.76)  (3.73)  
Diff anti-SD(US-Target) 
         × Exchange-listed 
    -0.352 
(-0.51) 
 -0.080 
(-0.12) 
 
Diff anti-SD(US-Target) 
         × Non-exchange-listed 
    0.124 
(0.25) 
 -0.132 
(-0.26) 
 
SOX 2.518 *** 2.556 **     
 (4.29) (4.35)      
SOX × Exchange-listed 0.263       
 (1.33)       
SOX × Non-exchange-listed 0.314       
 (1.51)       
SOX × Exchange-listed 
         × Diff anti-SD(US-Target) 
  0.423 
(0.62) 
     
SOX × Non-exchange-listed 
         × Diff anti-SD(US-Target) 
  0.289 
(0.52) 
     
Pseudo R² 6.63%  6.61%  9.94%  3.92%  
χ
2
     961       960         569        264  
Prob > χ
2
     0.000      0.000        0.000      0.000  
    ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
The Acquisition Premium before and after the Enactment of SOX 
This table compares mean and median acquisition premiums before and after the enactment of SOX for both 
exchange and non-exchange-listed targets. The acquisition premium is measured by the natural logarithm of the 
percentage of the offer price to the closing price of the target four weeks before the M&A’s announcement. The pre-
SOX period consists of six years before the enactment year (2002), i.e. between 1996 and 2001; while the post-SOX 
period consists of the six years following the enactment year, i.e. the period between 2003 and 2008. The 
significance of the difference in means and medians is tested using the two-tailed t-test and Wilcoxon-z test 
respectively.  
 
  Exchange-listed 
targets 
Non-exchange-listed 
targets 
t-stat / 
Wilcoxon-z 
Entire period : 1996-2008 (including 2002)   
N 197 210  
Mean 0.303 0.199      3.97*** 
Median 0.279 0.191      3.12*** 
Pre-SOX 1996-2001   
N 81 99  
Mean 0.291 0.254 0.96 
Median 0.285 0.238 1.34 
Post-SOX 2003-2008   
N 105 98  
Mean 0.312 0.140      5.06*** 
Median 0.273 0.144      4.14*** 
t-stat -0.55      3.33***  
Wilcoxon-z 0.15     2.77***  
       ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 7  SOX and the Takeover Premium 
This table reports OLS regressions for a sample of 3,413 non-US targets, 447 of which were cross-listed in the US at 
the moment of the acquisition, over the 1990-2008 period. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
takeover premium, measured as the percentage of the offer price to the closing price of the target four weeks before 
the M&A’s announcement. Explanatory variables for the cross-listing are: Exchange-listed, a dummy variable to 
identify ADRs listed on an organized exchange (Level II and III) and direct listings via common shares; Non-
exchange-listed, a dummy variable to identify ADRs listed over the counter (Level I) or via Rule 144a. Explanatory 
variables at the country level are: Anti-self-dealing, an index from Djankov et al. (2008) measuring the degree of 
legal protection of minority shareholders; Diff anti-SD(US-Target), the difference in anti-self-dealing levels between the 
US and target country. Control variables at the firm level are: Target size, the logarithm of the target’s market 
capitalization four weeks before the M&A's announcement; Growth, the 3-year growth rate of the target's sales, 
measured at the year-end preceding the announcement. Control variables at the transaction level are: Cross-border, 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target country differs from the acquirer country and 0 otherwise; Tender offer, 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal involves a tender offer and 0 otherwise; Contested bid, a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the number of bidders is greater than 1 and 0 otherwise; Hostile, a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the transaction is classified as hostile or unsolicited and 0 otherwise; Toehold, the percentage of target's shares 
owned by the acquirer at the announcement. Additional dummy variables include: SOX; which is equal to 1 for 
mergers announced after August 29, 2002. Year and industry dummies (at one-digit SIC code level) are included in 
all regressions but are not reported. Robust standard errors are used and corrected for clustering at the country level. 
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 Entire Period  1990-2008 
Pre-SOX 
1990-2001 
Post-SOX 
2003-2008 
      (1)  (2)       (3)       (3)  
Exchange-listed 0.058 ** 0.054 * 0.089 *** 0.104 *** 
 (1.92)  (1.71)  (5.67)  (3.09)  
Non-exchange-listed 0.027  0.023  0.044 * -0.021  
 (1.22)  (1.03)  (2.01)  (-1.06)  
Target size -0.013 ** -0.012 ** -0.022 *** -0.003  
 (-2.69)  (-2.68)  (-6.03)  (-0.53)  
Growth 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000 * 
 (2.52)  (2.46)  (2.27)  (1.91)  
Cross-border 0.070 *** 0.071 *** 0.057 *** 0.082 *** 
 (4.79)  (4.98)  (3.91)  (4.73)  
Tender offer 0.136 *** 0.136 *** 0.159 *** 0.109 *** 
 (7.62)  (7.71)  (7.38)  (5.08)  
Contested bid 0.101 *** 0.098 *** 0.092 *** 0.100 ** 
 (4.48)  (4.69)  (2.87)  (2.35)  
Hostile 0.060 *** 0.060 *** 0.052 *** 0.081 * 
 (3.81)  (3.86)  (2.79)  (1.95)  
Toehold -0.158 *** -0.156 *** -0.120 ** -0.178 *** 
 (-4.98)  (-4.86)  (-2.06)  (-5.5)  
Anti-self-dealing 0.083 ** 0.083 * 0.103 ** 0.059  
 (2.04)  (1.96)  (2.40)  (1.12)  
Diff anti-SD(US-Target) 
 × Exchange-listed 
    0.243 
(2.94) 
*** 0.276 
(1.84) 
* 
Diff anti-SD(US-Target) 
× Non-exchange-listed 
    -0.137 
(-1.64) 
 -0.053 
(-0.98) 
 
SOX -0.028  -0.025      
 (-0.46)  (-0.39)      
SOX× Exchange-listed 0.090 ** 0.108 **     
 (2.66)  (2.64)      
SOX× Non-exchange-listed -0.036  -0.039      
 (-1.18)  (-1.19)      
SOX × Exchange-listed 
         × Diff anti-SD(US-Target) 
  0.211 
(1.81) 
*     
SOX × Non-exchange-listed 
         × Diff anti-SD(US-Target) 
  -0.063 
(-0.8) 
     
R²    16.12%     16.35%  18.07%  11.98%  
N observations   3396    3396  1667  1729  
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TABLE 8  Cox Regressions : Determinants of the Takeover Hazard 
 
This table reports Cox proportional hazard regressions for a sample of 6,104 non-US firms over the 1990-2008 
period, for a total of 43,146 firm-year observations. The dependent variable equals one if the acquisition occurs 
during the firm-year. Explanatory variables related to the cross-listing are: Exchange-listed, a dummy variable to 
identify ADRs listed on an organized exchange (Level II and III) and direct listings via common shares; Non-
exchange-listed, a dummy variable to identify ADRs listed over the counter (Level I) or via Rule 144a. Firm-level 
variables, measured at the beginning of the year, are: Size, the logarithm of market capitalization; Growth, the 3-
year growth rate of sales; Leverage, the ratio of total debt to total assets; Tobin’s Q, computed as (book value of 
assets + market capitalization - book value of equity)/book value of assets; Foreign sales, the ratio of foreign sales 
to total sales; ROE, the ratio of net income to book value of equity; FCF, the ratio of free cash-flows to total assets. 
Country-level variables are: Anti-self-dealing is an index from Djankov et al. (2008) measuring the degree of legal 
protection of minority shareholders. The table reports coefficient estimates â (which are equal to the logarithm of 
hazard ratios). Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the firm level. z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Exchange-listed 0.370 *** 0.474 *** 0.492 *** 
 (3.98)  (4.82)  (5.02)  
Non-exchange-listed 0.145  0.116  0.134  
 (1.47)  (1.18)  (1.36)  
Size   -0.023  -0.015  
   (-0.55)  (-0.38)  
Growth   -0.735 *** -0.732 *** 
   (-10.06)  (-10.17)  
Leverage   0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
   (8.15)  (8.08)  
Tobin’s Q   -0.178 *** -0.177 *** 
   (-7.62)  (-7.61)  
Foreign sales   0.000 *** 0.000 ** 
   (2.79)  (2.37)  
ROE   0.002  0.002  
   (0.59)  (0.60)  
FCF   -0.002  -0.002  
   (-1.42)  (-1.41)  
Anti-self-dealing      0.323 *** 
     (3.58)  
Log likelihood -16 661  -16 520  -16 514  
χ
2
 17  243  268  
Prob > χ
2
 0.000  0.000  0.000  
      ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 9  The Takeover Likelihood : Developed versus Emerging Countries 
 
This table reports logistic regressions for the takeover likelihood for both developed and emerging countries. The sample of developed countries includes 4,421 non-US 
firms while emerging countries includes 1,683 firms over the 1990-2008 period. The dependent variable takes the value of one if the acquisition occurs during the firm-
year. Explanatory variables related to the cross-listing are: Exchange-listed, a dummy variable to identify ADRs listed on an organized exchange (Level II and III) and 
direct listings via common shares; Non-exchange-listed, a dummy variable to identify ADRs listed over the counter (Level I) or via Rule 144a. Firm-level variables, all 
measured at the beginning of the year, are: Target size, the logarithm of market capitalization; Growth, the 3-year growth rate of sales; Leverage, the ratio of total debt to 
total assets; Tobin’s Q, computed as (book value of assets + market capitalization - book value of equity)/book value of assets; Foreign sales, the ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales; ROE, the ratio of net income to book value of equity; FCF, the ratio of free cash-flows to total assets. Country-level variables are: Anti-self-dealing, an 
index from Djankov et al. (2008) measuring the degree of legal protection of minority shareholders; Accounting, an index from Laporta et al. (1998) measuring the 
quality of accounting standards; Common law, a dummy variable to identify the legal origin (common versus civil law). Year, region and industry dummies (at one-digit 
SIC code level) are included in all regressions but are not reported. Standard errors are robust and corrected for clustering at the firm level. z-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. 
 
 Panel A. Developed countries Panel B. Emerging countries 
     Heckman correction     Heckman correction 
      Logit (1)       Logit (2)   Probit (1)      Logit (3)      Logit (4)        Logit (5)    Probit (2)       Logit (6) 
Exchange-listed 0.248 ** 0.246 **   0.244 ** 1.452 *** 1.377 ***   1.476 *** 
 (2.16)  (2.14)    (2.11)  (4.23)  (3.65)    (4.28)  
Non-exchange-listed 0.107  0.108    0.095  0.310  0.303    0.327  
 (0.99)  (0.99)    (0.86)  (1.4)  (1.34)    (1.47)  
Size -0.100 * -0.098 * 0.296 *** -0.134 * -0.973 ** -0.980 ** 1.007 *** -0.429  
 (-1.94)  (-1.89)  (3.04)  (-1.89)  (-2.55)  (-2.55)  (4.11)  (-1.08)  
Growth -0.565 *** -0.565 *** -0.037  -0.560 *** -0.545 ** -0.547 ** 0.033  -0.508  * 
 (-6.43)  (-6.42)  (-1.62)  (-6.36)  (-1.97)  (-1.97)  (1.01)  (-1.85)  
Leverage 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 0.000 * 0.004 *** -0.003  -0.003  0.001  -0.003  
 (6.82)  (6.81)  (1.76)  (6.61)  (-0.82)  (-0.83)  (1.61)  (-0.7)  
Tobin’s Q -0.224 *** -0.224 ***   -0.223 *** -0.141 * -0.141 *    -0.131 * 
 (-7.1)  (-7.09)    (-7.07)  (-1.88)  (-1.88)    (-1.77)  
Foreign sales -0.002 *** -0.002 *** 0.001  -0.002 *** 0.001  0.001  0.005 *** 0.005  
 (-2.66)  (-2.66)  (1.23)  (-2.78)  (0.37)  (0.42)  (3.11)  (1.32)  
ROE 0.003  0.003    0.003  -0.003  -0.003    -0.003  
 (0.82)  (0.82)    (0.82)  (-0.76)  (-0.74)    (-0.82)  
FCF -0.004  -0.004    -0.004  -0.004  -0.004    -0.005  
 (-1.38)  (-1.38)    (-1.38)  (-0.97)  (-0.98)    (-1.03)  
Anti-self-dealing 0.823 *** 0.815 ***   0.792 *** 1.241 ** 1.289 **   0.478  
 (10.32)  (9.83)    (9.14)  (2.19)  (2.20)    (0.6)  
Diff Anti-SD(US-Target) 
    × Exchange-listed 
  -0.302 
(-0.63) 
       0.521 
(0.40) 
     
Diff Anti-SD(US-Target                  
    × Non-exchange-listed 
  0.049 
(0.14) 
       0.223 
(0.20) 
     
Accounting     -0.028 ***       0.017 *   
     (-4.19)        (1.67)    
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Common law 0.450 *** -0.728 *** 
     (4.34)        (-3.50)    
Lambda       -0.182        0.899  
       (-0.95)        (1.61)  
Pseudo R²         5.34%             5.34%            11.06%           5.35%            5.60%             5.61%            19.55%              5.72%  
χ
2
   667           667           262           668           137           135           297          140  
Prob > χ
2
        0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000  
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 10  The Takeover Premium : Developed versus Emerging Countries 
 
This table reports OLS regressions on the takeover premium for developed and emerging countries over the 1990-
2008 period. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the takeover premium, measured as the percentage 
of the offer price to the closing price of the target four weeks before the M&A’s announcement. Explanatory 
variables related to the cross-listing are: Exchange-listed, a dummy variable to identify ADRs listed on an organized 
exchange (Level II and III) and direct listings via common shares; Non-exchange-listed, a dummy variable to 
identify ADRs listed over the counter (Level I) or via Rule 144a. Explanatory variables at the country level are: 
Anti-self-dealing, an index from Djankov et al. (2008) measuring the degree of legal protection of minority 
shareholders; Diff Anti-SD, the difference in the anti-self-dealing levels between the US and target countries. Control 
variables at the firm level are: Target size, the logarithm of the target’s market capitalization four weeks before the 
M&A's announcement; Growth, the 3-year growth rate of the target's sales, measured at the year-end preceding the 
announcement. Control variables at the transaction level are: Cross-border, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
target country differs from the acquirer country and 0 otherwise; Tender offer, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
deal involves a tender offer and 0 otherwise; Contested bid, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the number of bidders 
is greater than 1 and 0 otherwise; Hostile, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is classified as hostile or 
unsolicited and 0 otherwise; Toehold, the percentage of target's shares owned by the acquirer at the announcement. 
Year and industry dummies (at one-digit SIC code level) are included in all regressions but are not reported. Robust 
standard errors are used and corrected for clustering at the country level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
 Panel A. Developed countries Panel B. Emerging countries 
     (1)     (2)     (3)        (4)       (5)      (6)  
Exchange-listed 0.098  ** 0.086  ** 0.077  *** 0.234  *** 0.203   *** 0.222   *** 
 (2.39)  (2.40)  (4.48)  (4.84)  (5.65)  (7.79)  
Non-exchange-listed 0.024  0.012  -0.002  0.020  0.003  0.006  
 (1.32)  (0.68)  (-0.16)  (0.38)  (0.07)  (0.12)  
Target Size -0.008  -0.013  ** -0.010  * -0.035  ** -0.037   ** -0.037   ** 
 (-1.24)  (-2.49)  (-1.94)  (-2.10)  (-2.26)  (-2.26)  
Growth 0.001  ** 0.001  ** 0.001  ** 0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (2.02)  (2.50)  (2.44)  (0.69)  (0.91)  (0.79)  
Cross-border   0.068  *** 0.069  ***   0.115   ** 0.111   ** 
   (4.04)  (4.47)     (2.49)  (2.54)  
Tender offer   0.143  *** 0.134  ***   0.119   ** 0.126   ** 
   (7.58)  (6.38)    (2.61)  (2.49)  
Contested bid   0.108  *** 0.107  ***   -0.015  -0.012  
   (5.35)  (5.43)    (-0.11)  (-0.09)  
Hostile   0.055  *** 0.054  ***   0.362   * 0.365   * 
   (3.65)  (3.53)    (1.93)  (1.79)  
Toehold   -0.203  *** -0.191  ***   -0.001  -0.002  
   (-4.95)  (-5.00)    (-0.01)  (-0.03)  
Anti-self-dealing     0.099  *     -0.071  
     (1.94)      (-0.75)  
Diff Anti-SD(US-Target) 
 × Exchange-listed 
    0.301 
(2.69) 
 **     -0.175 
(-0.75) 
 
Diff Anti-SD(US-Target) 
× Non-exchange-listed 
    -0.099 
(-1.81) 
 *     -0.107 
(-0.80) 
 
R² 6.11%  16.32%  17.23%  11.81%  19.13%  19.34%  
N observations 3066  3062  3062  335  334  334  
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 11  The Takeover Premium : Instrumental Variable Estimation 
 
This table reports the second-stage (instrumented) regressions for a sample of 3,413 non-US targets, 447 of which 
were cross-listed in the US at the moment of the acquisition, over the 1990-2008 period. The dependent variable is 
the natural logarithm of the takeover premium, measured as the percentage of the offer price to the closing price of 
the target four weeks before the M&A’s announcement. Explanatory variables at the country level are: Anti-self-
dealing, an index from Djankov et al. (2008) measuring the degree of legal protection of minority shareholders. 
Control variables at the firm level are: Target size, the logarithm of the target’s market capitalization four weeks 
before the M&A's announcement; Growth, the 3-year growth rate of the target's sales, measured at the year-end 
preceding the announcement. Control variables at the transaction level are: Cross-border, a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the target country differs from the acquirer country and 0 otherwise; Tender offer, a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the deal involves a tender offer and 0 otherwise; Contested bid, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
number of bidders is greater than 1 and 0 otherwise; Hostile, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is 
classified as hostile or unsolicited and 0 otherwise; Toehold, the percentage of target's shares owned by the acquirer 
at the announcement. Year and industry dummies (at one-digit SIC code level) are included in all regressions but are 
not reported. Standard errors are robust and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Exchange-listed (fitted) 0,306   ***   
 (2,82)    
Non-exchange-listed (fitted)   0,020  
   (0,07)  
Target Size -0,019   *** -0,012  
 (-3,77)  (-1,12)  
Growth 0,000   *** 0,000   ** 
 (2,81)  (2,26)  
Cross-border 0,063   *** 0,073   *** 
 (5,17)  (6,52)  
Tender offer 0,137   *** 0,133   *** 
 (11,2)  (11,81)  
Contested bid 0,093   *** 0,106   *** 
 (4,39)  (5,04)  
Hostile 0,040  0,060  
 (1,49)  (1,34)   
Toehold -0,156   *** -0,162   *** 
 (-5,17)  (-5,29)  
Anti-self-dealing 0,077   *** 0,102   *** 
 (3,65)  (3,87)  
R²       12,64% 16,59% 
N observations 3142  3169  
          ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 12  The Takeover Premium : Country weight adjustment 
 
Panel A reports WLS regressions for a sample of 3,413 non-US targets, 447 of which were cross-listed in the US at 
the moment of the acquisition, over the 1990-2008 period. Panel B reports OLS regressions for a sub-sample of 
2,574 non-UK targets, 344 of which were cross-listed in the US at the acquisition. The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of the takeover premium, measured as the percentage of the offer price to the closing price of the 
target four weeks before the M&A’s announcement. Explanatory variables related to the cross-listing are: 
Exchange-listed, a dummy variable to identify ADRs listed on an organized exchange (Level II and III) and direct 
listings via common shares; Non-exchange-listed, a dummy variable to identify ADRs listed over the counter (Level 
I) or via Rule 144a. Explanatory variables at the country level are: Anti-self-dealing, an index from Djankov et al. 
(2008) measuring the degree of legal protection of minority shareholders; Diff Anti-SD, the difference in the anti-
self-dealing levels between the US and target countries. Control variables at the firm level are: Target size, the 
logarithm of the target’s market capitalization four weeks before the M&A's announcement; Growth, the 3-year 
growth rate of the target's sales, measured at the year-end preceding the announcement. Control variables at the 
transaction level are: Cross-border, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the target country differs from the acquirer 
country and 0 otherwise; Tender offer, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal involves a tender offer and 0 
otherwise; Contested bid, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the number of bidders is greater than 1 and 0 otherwise; 
Hostile, a dummy variable that equals 1 if the transaction is classified as hostile or unsolicited and 0 otherwise; 
Toehold, the percentage of target's shares owned by the acquirer at the announcement. Year and industry dummies 
(at one-digit SIC code level) are included in all regressions but are not reported. Robust standard errors are used and 
corrected for clustering at the country level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
 Panel A. Weighted Least Squares Panel B. Non-UK targets 
     (1)     (2)     (3)        (4)       (5)      (6)  
Exchange-listed 0,170  *** 0,148  *** 0,163  *** 0,149  *** 0,134   *** 0,130   *** 
 (5,46)  (5,57)  (4,15)  (4,73)  (5,95)  (4,99)  
Non-exchange-listed -0,036  -0,025  0,015  0,005  -0,005  0,006  
 (-1,05)  (-0,73)  (0,34)  (0,23)  (-0,27)  (0,28)  
Target Size -0,008  -0,013   ** -0,014  ** -0,004  -0,011   ** -0,010   ** 
 (-1,29)  (-2,34)  (-2,31)  (-0,76)  (-2,27)  (-2,07)  
Growth 0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  * 0,000   ** 0,000   ** 
 (0,64)  (1,3)  (0,68)  (1,77)  (2,13)  (2,15)  
Cross-border   0,075  *** 0,076  ***   0,086   *** 0,088   *** 
   (2,91)  (3,05)    (5,48)    (5,55)  
Tender offer   0,118  *** 0,124  ***   0,132   *** 0,132   *** 
   (4,8)  (4,79)    (8,34)  (8,17)  
Contested bid   0,061  * 0,051   *   0,076   *** 0,076   *** 
   (1,93)  (1,6)    (3,16)  (3,28)  
Hostile   0,124   *** 0,111  ***   0,079   *** 0,076   *** 
   (3,23)  (2,77)    (3,69)  (3,33)  
Toehold   -0,096  * -0,121   **   -0,127   *** -0,131   *** 
   (-1,94)  (-2,33)    (-4,53)  (-4,6)  
Anti-self-dealing     0,084  *     0,087   * 
     (1,74)      (1,81)  
Diff Anti-SD(US-Target) 
 × Exchange-listed 
  
 
 0,197 
(2,02)  ** 
  
 
 0,252 
(2,15)   ** 
Diff Anti-SD(US-Target) 
× Non-exchange-listed 
  
 
 -0,017 
(-1,42)  
  
 
 -0,088 
(-1,89) 
  * 
R² 9,22%  15,54%  14,97%  4,03%  12,76%  12,94%  
N observations     3413  3408  3396    2574   2569    2557  
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
